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Summary 
Trademarks are valuable assets for undertakings, it is what connects them and 
their products when placed before consumers. This is something that others want 
to take advantage of and thus proprietors need to defend themselves against. 
Being able to prevent infringements before they occur is necessary in order to 
avoid costly procedures, but those measures might not be accepted by legislations 
other than those for IPRs. Article 101 and 102 TFEU prohibits any restrictions of 
competition and limitations of the market that are not justified and have positive 
effects on the trade between Member States. The history of the CJEU‟s case law 
shows a gradual increase in the appreciation of trademarks and its value but also 
limitations to the exercise of trademark rights.  
The CJEU have made a distinction between the existence and exercise of a 
trademark right and has stated that it is only the exercise that can be limited by 
Article 101 TFEU. Scholars have expressed concern regarding this statement and 
argue that at some point the existence of a mark can be threatened if the exercise 
of the trademark right is limited.  
Although a mark with a reputation is granted a stronger protection than a non-
repute mark it is still limited by the principle of exhaustion. The measures a 
proprietor takes in order to prevent infringements before they occur must be 
justified and bring positive results for the benefits of consumers. Allowing a 
licensee to become the proprietor of the licensor‟s trademark in another Member 
State thus being able to exercise the rights it includes, is considered hindering 
parallel trade according to the CJEU and thus in violation of Article 101 TFEU.  
Wanting to protect the respectable image of a trademark is not considered as a 
legitimate justification for banning the sale of the trademarked goods on the 
internet. AG Mazak have expressed that there might occur situations in the future 
where protection from a diminished image is justification for not allowing internet 
sales, the CJEU did not follow that reasoning. The result of the CJEU‟s judgments 
is, that despite the risks the internet poses for trademarks, their reputation is not a 
justification for them being made available for sale on it. Proprietors have been 
presented with the fact that they cannot be in charge of what damages their marks 
reputation. 
The Commission has presented amendments to the TMD and TMR which will 
generate more legal certainty for the trademark proprietors and also grant them 
more power to fight counterfeiting. The proposed amendments are positive news 
which will generate better protection for the trademarks of the Union. However, 
the CJEU still seems to be a bit reluctant to recognize the importance of 
trademarks. By not accepting the importance of a trademark‟s image, the CJEU 
does not understand the trademarks completely and have not followed the 
development of trademarks and their importance in today‟s market.  
2 
 
Sammanfattning 
Varumärken är värdefulla tillgångar för företag, det används av konsumenter 
for att identifiera företag och dess produkter. Detta är något som andra vill 
utnyttja och vilket varumärkets innehavare då måste få försvara sig mot. Att 
kunna förebygga varumärkesintrång innan de inträffar genom olika åtgärder är en 
nödvändighet för att undvika kostsamma förfaranden, men dessa åtgärder godtas 
ibland inte av andra lagstiftningar än de för immateriella rättigheter. Artikel 101 
och 102 i EUF-fördraget förbjuder alla inskränkningar av konkurrensen och 
hinder av den fira handeln som inte är motiverade och har positiva effekter på 
handeln mellan medlemsstaterna. EU-domstolens rättspraxishistoria visar en 
gradvis ökning av uppskattningen för varumärken och dess värde men också 
begränsningar för utövandet av varumärkesrättigheter.  
EU-domstolen har gjort en åtskillnad mellan existensen och utövandet av en 
varumärkesrätt och har sagt att det är bara utövningen som kan begränsas genom 
artikel 101 i EUF-fördraget. Akademiker har uttryckt oro angående detta 
påstående och hävdar att ett varumärkes existens kan hotas om utövandet av 
varumärkesrätten begränsas.  
Kända varumärken ges ett starkare skydd än ett okänt märke, men det kan 
begränsas av konsumtion principen. De åtgärder en varumärkesinnehavare tar i 
syfte att förhindra intrång innan de inträffar måste motiveras och ge positiva 
resultat till fördel för konsumenterna. Att tillåta en licenstagare att bli innehavare 
av licensgivarens varumärke i en annan medlemsstat och därmed kunna utnyttja 
de rättigheter som det innebär, anses hindra parallellhandeln enligt EU-domstolen 
och är därmed i strid med Artikel 101 i EUF-fördraget. 
Skydda den respektabla bilden (imagen) av ett varumärke, anses inte som skäl 
för att förbjuda försäljningen av de varumärkesskyddade varorna på internet. AG 
Mazak har uttryckt att det kan uppkomma situationer i framtiden där skydd från 
skador på märkets image är motivering nog för att inte tillåta försäljning via 
internet, EU-domstolen följer dock inte detta resonemang. Resultatet av EU-
domstolens domar är, att trots de risker internet innebär för varumärken, är 
skyddet av deras rykte inte ett skäl för att dem inte skall göras tillgängliga för 
försäljning på internet. Varumärkesinnehavare har blivit informerade att de inte 
kan kontrollera vad som anses skada deras varumärkens rykte. 
Kommissionen har lagt fram ändringar till TMD och TMR som kommer att 
generera mer rättssäkerhet för varumärkesinnehavare och även ge dem mer makt 
för att bekämpa varumärkesförfalskning. De föreslagna ändringarna är positiva 
nyheter som kommer att generera bättre skydd för varumärken i unionen. Dock 
verkar EU-domstolen ändå att vara lite tveksamma till att erkänna vikten av 
varumärken. Genom att inte acceptera betydelsen av ett varumärkes image, verkar 
det som att EU-domstolen inte förstår varumärken helt och har inte följt 
utvecklingen av varumärken och deras betydelse för dagens marknad. 
3 
 
Abbreviations 
AG Advocate General 
  
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
  
EUF-fördraget Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
  
GC General Court 
  
IPR Intellectual Property Right 
  
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
  
TMD Trademark Directive 
  
TMR Trademark Regulation 
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1 Introduction 
Following introduction of this thesis will contain a background of why I find the 
subject so interesting followed by the thesis‟ purpose and how I meant to fulfil the 
purpose. This chapter is aimed to give the reader an explanation of why the thesis 
is following the road chosen.  
1.1 Background 
It is not surprising that a trademark carries an enormous value, perhaps even 
greater than credited for. Large undertakings spend big sums of money in order to 
protect their trademarks and rightfully so since success often brings scavengers 
eager to capitalize on the fortune of others and will go through enormous lengths 
in order to do so.   
The moment consumers come in contact with a trademark, it will present an 
image that can be associated with the product bearing the mark. Consumers are 
not simply buying products from a particular undertaking, they are buying the 
„trademark experience‟ and the „brand image‟ that comes with the product. The 
exclusive rights necessary to ensure protection against confusion also protect the 
investment made in the creation of a favourable trademark image.
1
  
It is a well-known fact that Intellectual property rights grant the proprietor the 
sole right, a monopoly, to the mark, invention or artistic piece etc. This is deemed 
necessary from an undertaking‟s perspective or rather a proprietor‟s perspective 
since it will result in profits from sales and further incentives from investors. 
Authorities and competitors can find these rights, although promoting same result 
sought by competition rules, in conflict with the competition rules.  
Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU aims to safeguard the European market from 
measures that limits the competition and the range of products on it, thus 
promoting incentives to make quality goods for a lower cost leading to a lower 
sales price. The collision between the two legislations occur when the protective 
measures taken by a proprietor, allowed by national IP law, are deemed as 
unnecessarily restrictive or unjustified by competition law and its interpreter.  
The CJEU have through its case law tried to give some clarity to where the line 
of excessive trademark protection lies. In Pierre Fabre
2
, the CJEU ruled that a 
ban on internet sales of a product put by the distributor in order to protect a 
trademark‟s respected image is not justification enough and thus is in violation of 
the competition rules. The AG in the case had a different opinion, which makes 
one wonder if the ability to purchase a product on the internet have a negative 
effect on a trademarks respectable image, would a person be deterred from 
purchasing a product if it is available online since it could be considered as less 
„fancy‟? 
                                                 
1
  Senftleben, Martin „Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies: Back to Basics?‟ 
VU University, Faculty of Law, June 30 2011, Amsterdam, p. 141. 
2
  Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l‟Autorité de la 
concurrence, Ministre de l‟Économie, de l‟Industrie et de l‟Emploi, Ministère public and the 
European Commission, 13 October 2011, [2011] ECR (*) (Pierre Fabre). 
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Even if some or most consumers would not believe so, should it still not be up 
to the proprietor to decide how his products should be viewed and what image it 
should have?  
Some could argue that intellectual property is not good since it creates 
monopolies, but the truth is that IPRs lead to incentives for R&D,
3
 which leads to 
new products. If a proprietor is not allowed control the image of his trademark, 
then what value has it? 
It does not get easier either that the IP-rules are mainly national due to the 
principle of territoriality. The Cassis De Dijon
4
 principle makes it more urgent for 
proprietors to prosecute infringers, since they otherwise will not be able to hinder 
the products entrance on the national market.  
Allowing a licensee to register and become the proprietor of your trademark in 
another Member State is considered hindering parallel trade and not in accordance 
with the competition rules. The limitations to the trademark right keeps piling up, 
although they are not aimed to limit the trademark‟s existence. They are not 
limiting the possibility for a proprietor to prosecute infringers either. What the 
CJEU and the Commission does with their decisions are, according to them, 
limiting the exercise of the trademark right. This type of exercise I have chosen to 
call preparatory measures since they are taken in order to prevent infringements 
from occurring or at least make it more difficult to infringe the trademark. These 
measures becomes a problem in the light of competition law when it exists in 
form of a contract provision violating article 101 TFEU, or an action considered 
violating Article 102 TFEU. It is not bad that the competition rules are looked 
after but the results of the CJEU‟s decisions risks sometimes limiting the 
trademarks beyond what is necessary or even appropriate, leading to a weakening 
of the trademarks‟ protection. The history of the CJEU shows a negative attitude 
against trademarks, knowing how important they are, one can hope that negative 
attitude is not here today. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate where the line between excessive 
and appropriate trademark protection is drawn by the CJEU. The reason for this is 
that the competition rules can be considered violated, when a proprietor is trying 
to defend his monopoly, which his IPR constitutes, from infringers. Investigating 
where the CJEU has drawn the line for excessive protective measures by using 
other EU-legislation will generate a foundation for proprietors to see and base 
their actions on. The EU-legislation allows there to be more extensive protection 
for trademarks that are considered having a reputation, a famous trademark. It is 
therefore, of interest to investigate if a proprietor of a reputed trademark has the 
same extended protection when it comes to measures used to prevent 
infringement. Trademarks have become more important and valuable and the 
infringers are taking new measures in order to provide counterfeiting goods. The 
                                                 
3
  Martin, Brian „Against intellectual property‟, published in Philosophy and Social Action, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 July-September 1995, pp. 7-22, University of Wollongong Australia, see also, 
Yang, Deli, „Understanding and Profiting from Intellectual Property‟ a guide for practitioners and 
analysts, First Edition 2008,  Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, p. 25.  
4
  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 20 February 
1979, [1979] ECR 649 (Cassis de Dijon). 
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internet provides new means for infringements and the EU-legislation is in need 
of an update to be able to provide the proprietors with the measures necessary to 
protect their marks. The Commission have proposed amendments to the TMD and 
the TMR, which are aimed to meet the demand on more protection for trademarks. 
These amendments must be investigated in order to get an insight in what the 
future of trademark protection will look like. 
 
Questions I have set to answer in order to fulfil my aim are: 
What measures are a proprietor allowed to use in order to protect its‟ trademark 
according to the CJEU? 
  
Can a proprietor of a trademark with a good reputation (a famous trademark) 
go further in his protection of a trademark than others? 
 By „further‟ I imply, measures considered violating competition law and in 
most cases the CJEU would not allow them but grants the proprietor an exemption 
due to his trademarks reputation. 
 
Lastly I will look into what difference will the new TMD and TMR make, 
when implemented? 
 
1.3 Method/Material 
The thesis will be using legal dogmatic method with some legal history in 
order to see the development of the case law of the CJEU. 
By using case law from the CJEU, I will present the court‟s view on the matter 
since it draws the line when IP-law is in conflict with competition law. I want to 
make it completely clear that I do not claim that IP-law per se is interfering with 
the competition rules, what I mean is that the rights and measures granted and 
allowed by national IP-law are, when executed, in conflict with competition law. 
I have selected the case law that I found being relevant to illustrate the issue. 
By using literature, such as books and articles, I will present scholars‟ views on 
the issue from their perspective in order to present different views in the analysis. 
The case law selection of this thesis is not exhaustive but quite substantial. I 
have therefore chosen only to use the full name of the cases in the footnote when 
it is firstly mentioned and afterwards use a shorter name in order to make the 
reading go more smoothly.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The thesis will only concern trademarks. Patents and copyrights though very 
important IPRs will not be included. Trademarks are personally more interesting, 
since it is what a consumer will see and relate to when encountering a product, 
thus is a more open and public intellectual property than the two other mentioned 
rights.  
It is assumed that the reader has some basic knowledge of EU trademark law 
and competition law. Therefore, the basics of competition such as the provisions 
in article 101 and 102 together with other connecting legislation will not be 
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discussed in this paper. The same concerns the basics of trademark law such as 
application, granting and revocation processes and will be followed when 
discussing the proposed amendments to the TMD and TMR.  
I have chosen not to include the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
of 2010 in my study. The reason is that although fully relevant when discussing 
counterfeiting ACTA and signed by the EU and 22 Member States, the agreement 
is only ratified by Japan and yet not in effect for the EU Members. Mentioned 
should be though that if ACTA were to be ratified in the EU Member States then 
the proprietors will have more power to fight counterfeiting.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
This first chapter is aimed to make the reader see the thesis from my 
perspective and understand my way of thinking when I did my research.  
The second chapter of this thesis will present cases that had a significant effect 
on the development of the trademark rights and their positions on the EU-market 
are presented in chapter. The said chapter contains a piece of legal history in form 
of case law that will show the changed opinion of the CJEU regarding the 
importance of trademarks. The legislation concerning trademarks will also be 
presented in this chapter in order for the reader to get acquainted with the 
legislation in order to get a better understanding of the issue presented in this 
thesis. 
The amendments to the trademark legislation of the EU proposed by the 
Commission will be presented in chapter three. The reader will be presented with 
what could become the future of the EU legislation concerning trademarks. 
In chapter four, the case law chapter, I have chosen to present cases that 
enlighten the conflict between competition law and trademark rights. The cases 
concerns both preparatory and defensive measures, which will  be further 
explained in chapter 2.5, that is considered as violating competition law.  
The Fifth chapter is going to, as the name reveals, discuss the facts presented in 
this thesis, here I will present opinions from scholars on the cases in order for the 
reader to get a wider perspective on the conflict between competition law and 
trademarks. 
The last two chapters will be my analysis of the facts and opinions without any 
more input from other authors. I will through the analysis work through what I 
have presented in order to conclude my thesis by answering my questions set in 
the purpose. 
 
1.6 Before reading onwards 
Law is a constantly changing subject. Legislations become amended and 
judgements and literature get out-dated. The thesis is presenting case law 
representing an issue that is relevant at this moment. I acknowledge the fact that in 
a not too distant future the facts and opinions presented in this thesis together with 
my conclusion will become part of legal history and not be relevant any more. 
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Lastly, I would like to address the use of “his/he” or any other reference to the 
male gender in this thesis. Fully aware that the equality of the genders is not a 
guarantee in today‟s world, I still have chosen to use the term “his” in situations 
where I refer to a proprietor‟s ownership. The term “his” is not referring only to 
the male gender but also the female and transgender. It is mainly to simplify the 
reading and not in any way an attempt to discriminate against anyone.  
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2 Trademarks and Union Law 
The relation between trademarks and other EU legislations might not be 
completely clear, thus, an introduction will follow to show development of the 
CJEU‟s case law followed by a presentation of the collision between trademarks 
and EU-legislations. 
2.1 Negativity against trademarks 
The CJEU had a very negative view on trademarks function in its early 
judgements.
5
 In his opinion on the Sirena v Eda
6
 case, AG Dutheillet de Lamothe 
made a comparison of the importance between one of the world‟s most significant 
medical discoveries and a shaving cream trademark. He said: 
 
Both from the economic and from the human point of view the 
interests protected by patent legislation merit greater than those 
protected by trade-marks…. From the Human point of view, the debt 
which society owes to the „inventor‟ of the name „prep good morning‟ 
is certainly not of the same nature , to say the least, as that which 
humanity owes to the discoverer of penicillin.
7
 
  
An issue for the CJEU was the fact that the subject-matter of trademarks was 
not defined, thus the fundamental purpose of a trademark protection weren‟t 
reflected upon.
8
 In 1974, the CJEU ruled in the case Centrafarm v Winthorp
9
 that 
a trademark owner could not rely on Article 36 TFEU in order to prevent 
importation of products baring his trademark from another Member State, which 
had been put on the market in the latter Member State by him or with his consent. 
Regarding the subject-matter the CJEU stated: 
 
“In relation to trade marks, the specific subject-matter of the 
industrial property is the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark 
has the exclusive right to use that trade mark, for the purpose of 
putting products protected by the trademark into circulation for the 
first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against competitors 
wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade 
mark by selling products illegally bearing that trademark.”10 
 
                                                 
5
  Keeling, David T, „Intellectual Property Rights in EU Law‟: Volume I Free Movement and 
Competition Law, 2003 Oxford University Press, New York, p. 153. 
6
  Case 40/70, Sirena v Eda, 18 January 1971, [1971] ECR 69. 
7
  Ibid, p. 87. 
8
  Opinion of Mr Advocate General Dutheillet De La Monthe on case 40/70 Sirena v Eda, 
delivered on 21 January 1971, [1971] ECR 85.eling, p. 154.  
9
  Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v Winthrop BV, 31 October 1974, [1974] ECR 1183. 
10
  Ibid, para. 8. It is a development from the principle of exhaustion created earlier in Case 
78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 8 
June 1971, [1971] ECR 487 (Deutsche Grammophon), which will be discussed later in chapter 2.4.  
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It would take two more years before the court would mention the basic 
function of a trademark, which is establishing the origin of products.
11
 In the case 
Hoffman La-Roche v Centrafarm
12
 the CJEU stated that the „origin function‟ is 
the trademark‟s essential function rather than the basic function.13 Further, the 
CJEU also stated that the provision found in Article 36 TFEU was only allowing 
exceptions to the free movement if they are justified in order to protect the 
subject-matter of an IP-right and that an act that is lawful under Article 34 TFEU, 
can be unlawful according to 102 TFEU.
14
 The subject-matter was defined 
identically as in Centrafarm v Winthorp meaning that the trademark owner has the 
right to prevent others from stealing his goodwill by selling goods on which the 
mark has been placed illegally.  
A final step in the direction of a more positive attitude towards trademarks was 
taken in HAG II
15. As a contrast to AG Dutheillet de Lamothe‟s statement in 
Sirena v Eda, AG Jacobs pointed out, that trademarks, just like patents, stimulate 
economic progress if used correctly. The consumers, through purchases, will 
reward a manufacturer that consistently produces good quality goods; if there 
would be no trademark protection, there would simply be no incentives for the 
manufacturers to develop better products. Jacobs continued by stating that: 
 
“Trade marks are able to achieve that effect because they act as a 
guarantee, to the consumer, that all goods bearing a particular mark 
have been produced by, or under the control of, the same 
manufacturer and are therefore likely to be of similar quality.”16   
 
AG Jacobs made it clear that the quality is not always guaranteed by the mark. 
It is for the manufacturer to decide upon the quality of his goods and alternating 
the quality will only affect his profits not his competitors.
17
 The CJEU stated that 
trademark rights are an essential element in the system of fair competition, which 
is what the Treaty seeks to establish. Trademarks make it possible for the 
undertakings to keep its customers, since they identify the trademarks and relate 
them to a certain level of quality and undertaking. The CJEU stressed the 
importance of the trademark‟s purpose and stated that: 
 
“For the trade mark to be able to fulfil this role, it must offer a 
guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the 
control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their 
quality.”18 
 
                                                 
11
  Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v Terranova Industrie C. A. Kapferer & Co, 22 June 
1976, [1976] ECR 1183. 
12
  Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 23 May 1978, [1978] ECR 1139. 
13
  Ibid, para. 7. 
14
  Ibid, para. 16. 
15
  Case 10/89, Sa CNL-Sucal NV v HAG GF AG, 17 October 1990, [1990] ECR I-3711 (HAG 
II). 
16
  Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs on case 10/89 CNL-Sucal v HAG, delivered on 13 
March 1990, [1990] ECR I-3725, para. 18. 
17
  Ibid. 
18
  Case 10/89, HAG II, ECR I-3711, para. 13. 
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Some are however arguing that this statement from the court came too late. The 
court finally acknowledged the origin function of a trademark, though academics 
and legislators are now putting more importance on a trademark´s other functions 
(ancillary functions).
19
 The worries voices raised should according to Keeling be 
settled by the CJEU‟s later rulings where the advertising function of trademarks 
where recognized and it was said that proprietors have the right to prevent parallel 
importers or dealers use of its trademarks in adverts if it results in damage on the 
marks reputation.
20
 It has taken some time but the trademarks importance and 
value is not overseen by the CJEU, though the scope of protection according to 
some might be wider than the tests identifying the marks‟ subject-matter and 
essential function are implying.
21
 
 
2.2 Absence of harmonization cause 
problems 
Continuing with a bit of legal history, this section of the thesis will present, as 
the title states, the issues of not having completely harmonized trademark 
legislation. 
Consumers use trademarks in order to distinguish products from one and other 
by determining products origin without any possibility of confusion.
22
 Although 
there is a TMR it only concerns the so called “community marks” and the TMD is 
merely setting a minimum standard, so the trademark legislations of the Member 
States cannot be considered as completely harmonized.
23
 Further, the TFEU 
establishes that the trademark legislation of the member states shall follow the 
principle of territoriality.
24
 The CJEU has established in its case law that national 
law prevails in absence of harmonization. This would complicate cross boarder 
trademark protection if member states have different opinions on what constitute 
use of a trademark, since the use of a trademark is what causes legal disputes.  
In Keurkoop
25
 the CJEU ruled that because of the state of the Union law, at that 
time, the determination of conditions and procedures under which protection of 
designs are granted is a matter for national law.
26
 The case concerned a design of 
a handbag. Nancy Kean Gifts had registered in the Benelux countries a handbag 
design that it had acquired from USA and was selling it in the Netherlands. It was 
not the author of the design but rather a copyist.
27
 According to Benelux laws it 
was not necessary for a registrant of a design to be the author or to have a 
                                                 
19
  Keeling, p 157, footnote 31. 
20
  Keeling, p. 158, see also Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian 
Dior BV v Evora BV, 4 November 1997, [1997] ECR I-6013 and Case C-63/97, Bayerische 
Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel Deenik (BMW v Deenik), 
23 February 1999, [1999] ECR I-905. 
21
  Keeling, p. 158. 
22
  Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 3 December 1981, [1981] ECR 2913, para. 8. 
23
  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks COM/2013/0162 final - 2013/0089 (COD) 
„Proposed TMR‟, p. 1. 
24
  TFEU, art. 345. 
25
  Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 14 September 1982, [1982] ECR 2853. 
26
  Ibid, para. 18. 
27
  Ibid, para. 10, see also the „facts and issues‟ part of the report. 
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acquired a right to the design from the author. Thus it was possible to copy 
someone else‟s design and be granted, through registration, an exclusive right to 
use that design, which none other than the author or a person 
commissioned/employed by him could challenge.
28
  
After some time Nancy Kean Gifts discovers that another Dutch undertaking, 
Keurkoop, was selling an identical handbag in the Netherlands. The „copy‟ was 
just as the „original‟ manufactured in Taiwan and imported directly to the 
Netherlands. Nancy Kean Gifts applied to the competent Dutch court for an 
injunction preventing Keurkoop from infringing its design right. Keurkoop argued 
that Nancy Kean Gifts could not rely on article 36 TFEU since it is a mere copyist 
and it would be contrary to article 34 TFEU. 
The Dutch Court asked the CJEU if it was compatible with article, 34 and 36 
TFEU to enforce an exclusive design right against products imported from another 
Member State, when the proprietor is not the author or the first to file the design. 
Simply, would a copyist benefit from the protection granted by article 36 TFEU? 
The Commission stated in its observation to the court that intra-community 
trade should not be concerned since the products were imported directly from 
outside the common market.
29
 AG Reischl stated that, the questions would have 
arisen even if the goods would have been imported via another Member State.
30
 
The CJEU decided to answer the Dutch court‟s questions by stating that  
 
“…in the present state of Community law and in the absence of 
Community standardization or of a harmonization of laws the 
determination of the conditions and procedures under which 
protection of designs is granted is a matter for national rules…”.31 
 
Therefore, the national legislation in the Benelux countries made it possible to 
protect copied designs by granting the copyist an exclusive right, which existence 
only the author could challenge. The CJEU did not discuss any minimum 
characteristics, which would generate a measurement for a design right worthy the 
name intellectual property. However, this type of „test/investigation‟ is undertaken 
every time Article 30 is invoked on behalf of exclusive rights that are 
suspicious.
32
 Furthermore, if the judgement were to be taken literally, the Member 
States would be allowed to grant exclusive rights on the grounds that they sought 
fit and the rights would be valid against goods from other Member States. 
This would lead to the possibility of restrictions on imports based on what 
national law characterizes as an intellectual property right, no matter the level of 
its logic. Therefore, it is righteous to say that the CJEU did not mean what it said 
in its judgement in Keurkoop. The judgement must be read with a level of 
reasonableness, thus the „actual‟ statement would be understood as  
 
“the conditions and procedures under which intellectual property 
rights are granted are a matter for national law, provided that such 
conditions and procedures are not unreasonable or arbitrary and 
                                                 
28
  Ibid, case report „facts and issues‟, p 2856. 
29
  See p. 2860 of the case report. 
30
  Opinion of Advocate General Reischl, p. 2878. 
31
  Case 144/81, Keurkoop v Nancy Kean Gifts, ECR 2853, para. 18. 
32
  Keeling, p. 32. 
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provided that they do not lead to the grant of intellectual property 
rights for which there is no objective justification.”33 
 
The cause for the judgment‟s acceptance of copyists being granted an exclusive 
right is most likely the fact that the copied design was from a third country and 
that both the proprietor and the infringer were importing the goods directly from a 
third country. It is unlikely that the court would have accepted that a design 
created in one Member State is, without authorization, being copied, registered, 
granted IP protection, manufactured and sold in another Member State and the 
only challenger could be the creator. The Second Member State would in that case 
not only be able to create a monopoly for the copyist but also prevent goods, 
produced in other Member States authorized by the author, from being put on the 
national market.
34
  
2.3 Existence/Exercise Dichotomy 
 The CJEU has held that if its existence can be limited in a particular way 
intellectual property rights would be worthless.
35
 For instance, preventing the 
application of national legislation allowing the owner of a design right over car 
body panels to oppose the manufacture of such panels by third parties would be 
equivalent to challenging the very existence of that right.
36
  
The CJEU thus emphasizes the importance of not tampering with the existence 
of trademarks, which will be highlighted in the next section. However, one could 
wonder how much limitation to its exercise a trademark can take before its 
existence is affected. 
The CJEU have tried to establish a proper way of determining what constitutes 
justified restriction of the free movement of goods under Article 36. The tests 
developed are not considered very satisfactory and thus the CJEU are forced to 
continue the search for a proper solution.
37
 The well-known case Consten & 
Grundig
38
 resulted in the Existence/Exercise dichotomy, which means that the 
Treaty guarantees the intellectual property right‟s existence, while the exercise of 
the right could be limited by prohibitions laid down in the Treaty. The German 
undertaking Grundig granted the French company Consten an exclusive right to 
distribute Grundig‟s products in France, an exercise of its trademark right 
according to Article 8 TMD and 22 TMR. Consten was also permitted to register 
the trademark GINT (Grundig International) in France. Meanwhile another French 
company UNEF acquired products marketed by Grundig in Germany under the 
trademark GINT and sold them in France.  
                                                 
33
  Ibid, p. 33. 
34
  Ibid, p. 34. 
35
  Case 158/86 Warner Brothers and Metronome v Christianse, 17 May 1988, [1988] ECR 
2605, para. 18. 
36
  Case 53/87, Consorzio italiano della componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli v Maxicar v 
Régie nationale des usines Renault, 5 October 1988, [1988] ECR 6039 (CICRA v Renault), para. 
11. 
37
  Keeling, p. 50. 
38
  Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten S.A.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GMBH 
v Commission, 13 July 1966, [1966] ECR 299 (Consten & Grundig). 
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Consten initiated trademark infringement proceedings against UNEF before a 
French court. UNEF responded  by complaining to the Commission which 
adopted a decision declaring that the agreement between Consten and Grundig, 
allowing the first to register the mark GINT was in violation of Article 101.3 
TFEU since it was hindering parallel trade.
39
 With its decision, the Commission 
ordered the two parties to refrain from preventing others from acquiring products 
with the GINT trademark with plans to sell them in France.  
Consten and Grundig argued that the GINT trademark was an industrial 
property owned by Consten which Article 101 TFEU could not prejudiced 
according Articles 36 and 345 TFEU guaranteed that right. Further, they argued 
that the Commission‟s decision was in violation of those articles.40 The CJEU did 
not agree with Consten and Grundig, and stated that Article 36, which concerns 
free movement of goods, cannot limit the field of application of the Competition 
rules. Regarding the argument of Article 345 TFEU and its guarantee for 
intellectual property rights the CJEU ruled that though the decision orders the 
parties to refrain from using its right to hinder parallel trade it  
 
“…does not affect the grant of those rights but only limits their 
exercise to the extent necessary to give effect to the prohibition under 
Article 101.1.…”41 
 
The Existence/Exercise Dichotomy was born, even though the court did not use 
the word “existence” until a few years later in the case Parke, Davies42, when it 
mentioned an intellectual property right‟s existence is not affected by the 
prohibitions in Articles 101.1 and 102 TFEU.
43
 The Exercise/Existence 
Dichotomy have been criticized for being too vague and inapplicable and has not 
been used by the CJEU since 1982 in its judgement in Coditel II
44
.
45
 The 
argument against this distinction between exercise and existence is that if Union 
law can prevent the exercise of an intellectual property, then it will be weakened 
and eventually the existence of the right could be threatened.
46
 It can however still 
be said that the Dichotomy serves a purpose. It serves as a principle stating that no 
matter what limitations on intellectual property rights exercise Community law 
imposes, the substance of those rights must never be destroyed.   
 
                                                 
39
  Commission Decision 64/566/EEC of 23 September 1964 (IV/A-00004-03344 'Grundig-
Consten'), OJ 2545/64, Article premier-Article 4. 
40
  Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, ECR 299, p 317. 
41
  Ibid, p. 345. 
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  Case 24/67, Parke, Davies v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, 29 
February 1968, [1968] ECR 55. 
43
  Ibid, p. 72. 
44
  Case 262/81, Coditel SA, Compagnie Générale Pour la Diffusion de la Télévision Brussels, 
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Vog Films SA, Chambre Syndicale Belge Delacinématographie, Les Films La Boétie SA, Serge 
Pinon and Chambre Syndicale Desproducteurs Etexporateurs Defilm Francais, (“Coditel II”), 6 
October 1982, [1982] ECR 3381. 
45
  Keeling, pp. 54-55. 
46
  Ibid. 
15 
 
2.4 Legislation 
As known, a trademark right is granted by IP-authorities upon registration, or 
generated through use.
47
 The proprietor of a trademark is naturally in need of 
some defensive protection of his mark in order for it to fulfil its commercial 
purpose without unauthorised use by others. The Member States of the Union are 
obliged to grant proprietors the right to prevent others from using his mark or 
marks that are similar or identical to it and that in order to secure the free 
movement of goods the trademark protection granted by the Members legal 
systems must be same.
48
  
In order to acquire protection as registered trademark the mark must possess a 
distinctive character or distinctiveness. This requirement has been implemented in 
many legal systems since it can be found in the Paris Convention
49
 and the 
TRIPS-Agreement
50
. Article 6quinques B ii of the Paris Convention is consistent 
with Article 3(1)(b) of the TMD and Article 7(1)(b) of the TMR
51
. All three of the 
mentioned articles states that Member States shall deny registration if the mark is 
lacking distinctiveness, while in the TRIPS-Agreement article 15(1) states that 
marks that are able to distinguish the applicants goods or services from other 
undertakings shall be able to constitute a trademark, thus be protected. The EU 
legislation means that there is some harmonization within the Union, at least 
regarding „Community Trademarks‟. 
It is possible for marks that are not, by its looks, possessing a distinctive 
character to acquire one through use. The distinctiveness requirement is based on 
two grounds. Firstly, a mark must possess a certain symbol function, which it gets 
either by itself (inherent distinctiveness) or through establishment on the market 
(secondary meaning).
52
 Thus, meaning that even marks that are not „special‟ 
through its appearance can have a distinctive character since it is well recognized 
on the market. Secondly, in order to keep a high level of competition the 
requirement of distinctiveness is necessary so that very common words and 
elementary symbols should not be subject to a monopoly.
53
  
  The CJEU ruled in Windsurfing Chiemsee
54
 that a trademark acquires a 
distinctive character through use, when it can identify the product for which it has 
been registered, thus being able to show that it originates from a particular 
undertaking accordingly distinguishing that product from the goods of other 
undertakings.
55
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Any agreement or action that is distorting the balance of competition is 
considered „evil‟ and must therefore be prevented. The famous/infamous Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU have been protecting the competition on the Union market 
since the very beginning, leading to big fines for those who violate them.
56
  
The articles are governed by the principle laid down by Article 3 of Regulation 
No 1/2003
57
, which states that the articles becomes applicable, when an agreement 
between two or more undertakings might affect the trade between the Member 
States. The criteria „effect on trade‟ is based on three elements, 1) the concept of 
trade between Member States, 2) the notion of „may affect‟ and 3) the concept of 
„appreciability‟.  
The term „trade between Member States‟ is defined as all cross-border 
economic activity in order to cope with the objective of free movement of 
goods.
58
 The concept of „trade‟ has also been extended to include agreements that 
affects the competitive structure of the market.
59
.  
According to the test developed by the CJEU, the notion „may affect‟ implies 
that it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability that e.g. 
an agreement may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the 
pattern of trade between Member States.
60
 
The last element incorporated in the „effect on trade criterion‟, the concept of 
„appreciability‟ is mainly setting a quantitative level that limits the jurisdiction of 
Union law to concern e.g. agreements capable of having effects of a certain 
magnitude. Agreements having an insignificant effect on the market due to the 
parties‟ weak market position fall outside the scope of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.
61
 
The setup for the limitation of trademarks are clear. If a proprietor uses 
measures that affect the trade between the Member States through an agreement, 
he will fall within the scope of the competition rules and very likely be considered 
infringing those unless he has a weak position on the market.
62
 This becomes very 
relevant, as shown by Consten & Grundig
63
, when the proprietor exercises his 
right to license the trademark in accordance with the TMD and TMR.
64
  
2.3.1 Trademarks with reputation 
In paragraph 10 of the preamble of the TMD the Member States are granted the 
right to provide for more extensive protection for trademarks with a reputation. 
Article 5(2) of the TMD and article 9(1)(c) of the TMR offers an extension of the 
                                                 
56
  Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. European Commission, 28 April 2005, [2005] ECR II-1495 
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trademark protection to trademarks which have a reputation. In cases of double 
identity the extended protection for famous trademarks is not very clear so far.
65
 
Further, it is stated in Article 4 of the TMD that a permitted ground for refusal to 
register a new trademark is that there already exist a similar mark with a 
reputation and a registration would mean that the newer mark would take unfair 
advantage of the reputed mark.
66
  
The Scope of Article 5(2) and 4(4) of the TMD came into question in Davidoff 
v Gofkid
67
, where the CJEU was asked to answer whether the extended protection 
for reputed marks allows proprietors to prevent the use of identical or similar 
signs for identical or similar goods or services. The CJEU went in a different 
direction than AG Jacobs. He argued that the optional protection specified in 
Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of the TMD only concerns situations in which the goods 
or services in question are not similar to those for which the trademark is valid. It 
is for the national courts to decide, by examining the CJEU's case law concerning 
the protection enjoyed by marks with a highly distinctive character, whether there 
exists a likelihood of confusion or not where goods or services are similar.
68
 
The CJEU stated that the overall objective of the system has to be interpreted 
and not only the wording of article 5(2) of the TMD in this case. It went on and 
said that it is not possible to interpret the said article in a manner that would result 
in less protection for a reputed mark against signs used for identical goods, than 
for non-identical goods.
69
 If there would be no likelihood of confusion, then a 
proprietor could not rely on of Article 5(1)(b) in order to protect himself from 
impairment of the distinctive character or reputation of his trademark.
70
 Thus, 
Article 4(4) and 5(2) of the TMD allows Member States to provide protection for 
registered trademarks with a reputation against use of similar marks on identical 
goods, while unregistered marks seem not to have the same benefits.  
The same reasoning was conducted in Adidas v Fitnessworld
71
, where the 
CJEU ruled that the Member States must grant protection that is at least as 
extensive for identical goods as for non-identical goods and the option only 
concerns the principle itself and not the situations covered by the protection.
72
 
The first case where the requirements for obtaining the extended protection 
were laid down by the CJEU was in General Motors v Yplon
73
.
74
 The case 
concerns the use of the trademark “Chevy” which is a well-known mark registered 
for motor vehicles by General Motors (GM), but was used for cleaning products 
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by Yplon. GM sought an injunction against Yplon‟s use before Belgian court, 
which decided to stay the proceedings and ask the CJEU what level of reputation 
is required in order to benefit from the extended protection of Article 5(2) of the 
TMD. AG Jacobs investigated the context of the provisions of the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS-Agreement regarding well-known marks and found 
that there seemed to be a very high standard set by those agreements regarding 
what marks can be deemed as „well-known‟. By looking at national legislation, it 
was found that the Member States were adopting different terms for „well-known 
marks‟ and „marks with reputation‟. Jacobs stated that a mark with a reputation 
had to be known to a significant part of the relevant sectors of the public but it 
still did not need to be as well known as a well-known mark. He recommended 
that a series of criteria concerning the level of recognition of the mark in the 
relevant sectors of the public, its duration, the extent of the geographical area the 
mark is used in and the size of the investments in promoting the mark.
75
   
The Commission argued that the Benelux territory, although containing three 
Member States, should be considered as one Member State under Article 5(2) of 
the TMD. Since the trademark was registered for the Benelux, thus benefitting the 
protection of three national jurisdictions, AG Jacobs agreed with the Commission 
and stated that, it would be enough for the trademark to have a reputation in a 
substantial part of the Benelux countries, e.g. one of them or part of one of them, 
in order for it to be deemed as a reputed mark.
76
 
The CJEU stated, that in order for a trademark to suffer damage from the use of 
an identical sign, for products that is not similar, the first mark needs to be 
recognized to such an extent that the „public‟ would associate the two trademarks 
when confronted by the later mark despite the fact that the products are not 
similar.
77
 The definition of the „public‟ was said to be the public that is concerned 
by the trademark. Meaning, that it depends on the market whether it will be the 
public at large or a specialized public such as traders in a specific sector that is 
considered. No percentage level was set, the court instead adopted a requirement 
stating that the mark had to be “known by a significant part of the public 
concerned…” in order to benefit from the extended protection in Article 5(2). To 
decide this consideration have to be taken to all the relevant facts of the case, such 
as market shares held by the trademark, the intensity, geographical extent and 
duration of its use and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in 
promoting it. It was considered inappropriate to require that a mark should have a 
reputation throughout the Member State, so the CJEU ruled that the Territorial 
requirement of Article 5(2) of the TMD is fulfilled when it has a reputation in a 
substantial part of the Member State. Just like the AG, the court found it to be the 
Benelux countries in this case.
78
 
Almost ten years later, the CJEU was asked if the concept of „well-known‟ 
marks referred to in Article 4 of the TMD could be linked to an even more 
territorial scope, to also be concerning a region or city in a Member State rather 
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than a significant part of that State depending on which market the mark is used.
79
 
The AG argued that Article 4 of the TMD does not prevent the cancellation of a 
later trademark on the basis that there is an earlier unregistered trademark which is 
well known in a more limited geographical area than a substantial part of the 
concerned State.
80
 The CJEU took another view. Firstly, it stated that the 
provision in Article 4 lacked a definition regarding territory and that a trademark 
could not be required to be well known throughout the territory of a Member 
State, thus reasoning as it did in General Motors that, it is sufficient for a 
trademark to be well known in a substantial part of the Member State.
81
 Secondly, 
it stressed that the meaning of “in a Member State” precludes the possibility of a 
proprietor to use the provision in Article 4 in order to protect his unregistered 
trademark if the mark is only well known in a territory that does not constitute a 
substantial part of the Member State. The court emphasized that it is still possible 
to protect unregistered marks that has a local repute according to Article 4(4)(b) 
when appropriate.
82
 
In the Pago
83
 case the CJEU used its ruling in General Motors in order to 
answer when a Community trademark is deemed having a reputation in the 
Community, as stated by Article 9(1)(c) of the TMR, if its reputation does not 
exceed the borders of one Member State. The CJEU ruled that it is for the national 
courts to decide upon whether a mark is known by a significant part of the public 
and that it has to take in consideration all relevant facts such as market shares, 
promotion investments and geographical extent of the mark‟s use.84 The court 
already had ruled in General Motors that it is sufficient that a mark has a 
reputation in a substantial part of the Benelux countries, like one of the countries, 
in order for it to be considered as a reputed mark under Article 5(2) of the TMD. 
Therefore the CJEU ruled that the territory of one Member State is sufficient to 
constitute a substantial part of the Community and thus a Community trademark 
with a reputation in one Member State is deemed having a reputation in the 
Community under article 9(1)(c) of the TMR.
85
 
Through its case law the CJEU have shown that proprietors of reputed 
trademarks benefit from a wider protection. However, the cases concerned the 
defensive protective measures against already committed infringements. In the 
chapter 4 reputed trademark protection through preparatory measures will be 
highlighted with a different result. 
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2.5 Limiting Trademark Excersice Through 
Competition Rules 
As understood by the above, the existence of a trademark right is of no concern 
from a competition perspective; the issue lies with the exercise of that right. In its 
ruling in Deutsche Grammophon
86
 the CJEU limited the exercise of trademark 
rights. The German undertaking Deutsche Grammophon manufactured and 
marketed records for gramophones and attempted to fix the retail prices in 
Germany for its records. The Germany based company Metro was a retailer of 
Deutsche Grammophon and was selling the records through a chain of stores 
throughout Germany, however the prices were lower than Deutsche Grammophon 
requested. This led to a refusal to supply more records from Deutsche 
Grammophon and Metro had to acquire them through Deutsche Grammophon‟s 
retailers in France and then market them in Germany which it did again bellow the 
prices fixed by Deutsche Grammophon. Deutsche Grammophon obtained an 
injunction from a German court prohibiting Metro from selling its products.  
The German law gave manufacturers of records an exclusive distribution right. 
The legislation stated that the proprietor was not allowed to prevent sales of 
products that he, or someone with his consent, had put on the German market. 
However, when products were marketed abroad and then imported to Germany it 
was not clear. The case reached the highest instance in Germany, which in its turn 
referred two questions to the CJEU, which were not answered.
87
 The CJEU did 
however start discussing the situation in the light of Articles 34 and 36 TFEU and 
came up with the principle of exhaustion meaning that a proprietor cannot rely on 
the said articles in order to prevent sales of products put on the market of the 
Union by him or with his consent.
88
    
One of the questions asked by the German court was concerning dominant 
position and if Deutsche Grammophon could be considered abusing its position 
by applying higher prices on its products than the same products imported from 
another Member State if the principal performers are bound by an exclusive 
agreement.
89
 The CJEU stated that although possessing an exclusive right to 
distribute his products is not the same as possessing a dominant position, 
controlling prices, as in this case, is not sufficient to constitute abuse but it can be 
a determining factor in such abuse if it is unjustified.
90
 
In Hoffman-La Roche
91
, the CJEU stated that IPRs must be used as an 
instrument of abuse of a dominant undertaking to be unlawful under 102.
92
 
In Nungesser
93
 the CJEU ruled that an industrial or commercial property right 
does not possess the elements of a contract or a concerted practise referred to in 
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Article 101(1) TFEU. The exercise of the right might fall within the prohibitions 
of the TFEU if it were to manifest itself as the subject, the means or the 
consequence of an agreement.
94
 In the same case the CJEU states that the grant of 
an open exclusive licence to an intellectual property, which does not affect the 
position of third parties, such as parallel importers and licensees for other 
territories, is not in itself incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. This is however 
dependent on the relevant products of the agreement.
95
 The CJEU also confirmed 
its judgement in Consten & Grundig
96
 when it stated that absolute territorial 
protection granted to a licensee in order to control parallel trade and maintenance 
of separate national markets is contrary to the TFEU.
97
 The importance of the 
product at issue became the convicting factor in the case and meant that the 
agreement could not benefit from an exemption under 101(3) since the product 
was dependent upon by so many. The CJEU stated that, absolute and territorial 
protection goes beyond what is indispensable for the improvement of production, 
distribution or promotion of technical progress.
98
  
 The CJEU stated in CIRCRA v Renault
99
 that the exercise of an exclusive right 
could be prohibited under article 102 TFEU, if it gave rise to some form of 
abusive conduct from a dominant undertaking.
100
 While the securing ownership of 
an exclusive right to prevent unauthorized use of the trademark does not constitute 
an abusive method of eliminating competition.
101
 
As shown the existence of a trademark right is not an issue not even for a 
dominant undertaking. The exercise is the issue and what the CJEU have limited.   
2.6 Protective measures 
There are several ways of protecting a trademark and in order to investigate 
which are deemed excessive it seems logical to briefly go over them before 
looking at the other aspects that influence the CEJU‟s opinion on the matter. 
When an infringement is discovered, the most common step is to first compose 
and send a cease and desist letter to the infringer. This is mainly a measure used as 
a warning to scare of smaller infringers while larger undertakings might use the 
letter‟s arrival as the starting point of its revocation procedure. When the letter is 
received, the infringer complains to the right authority that the supposedly 
infringed trademark right is not valid, if no letter arrived then the infringement can 
continue. The cease and desist letter is not really a protective measure compared 
to infringement procedures in a courtroom, but it can have the same effect and 
also generate positive commercial for the proprietor. 
Jack Daniel‟s is a well-known trademark on the liquor market, though made 
from corn it is known as a whiskey and not bourbon. A few years ago, Jack 
Daniel‟s discovered that a book named „Broken Piano for President‟ was using a 
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picture for its cover that was identical to Jack Daniel‟s registered trademark for its 
„Old no 7‟ bottle label. The design and font used for the book‟s cover was 
identical with the bottle‟s label thus deemed an infringement by Jack Daniel‟s. 
Instead of threatening with procedures, the large liquor producer told the author 
that though it appreciated the reference it would be for the best, if the cover was 
changed for, the book‟s second edition. However, if the author would agree to 
change the cover already for the first edition Jack Daniel‟s offered to reimburse 
for all the costs that would occur when changing and reprinting the cover. The 
Author and publisher changed the cover but declined the offer.
102
  
This story was published along with the cease and desist letter, meaning that 
everyone could see how the big undertaking acted so kindly and offered to aid the 
alleged infringer thus only generating good publicity though acting defensively.   
According to the TMD, the proprietor of a mark has the right to hinder 
unlawful use of his mark,
103
 measures that can be taken are not mentioned in the 
TMD nor in the TMR, accordingly they have to be found in the CJEU‟s case law. 
As stated before the law grants the proprietor the right to prohibit the use of his 
trademark without his consent. This fairly strong right has been limited by the 
CJEU by creating the principle of exhaustion. Once a product baring the 
proprietors mark has been put on the market lawfully by him or with his consent 
the right to those products are exhausted and does not belong to the proprietor any 
more,
104
 unless there exist legitimate reasons for opposing further 
commercialisation, such as the product‟s condition have been reduced.105    
The usual step after the cease and desist letter is, if the infringement is not 
discontinued, a court procedure. As understood, this is not a problem in the eyes 
of any law of the Union. Both the letter and procedure are so called defensive 
protective measures that are necessary and not „questionable‟ from a competition 
perspective unless the IPR has been granted unlawfully.
106
 Still that can be 
resolved through an invalidity/revocation request from an accused infringer. 
Preventing use that gives cause to confusion to the public regarding a products 
origin is the core rationale of protection.
107
 Although these defensive measures 
against „confusion use‟ have been the subject of several CJEU cases, the problem 
often concerns whether the situation of the case gives the proprietor the right to 
use the defensive measure. 
The measures causing issues are the active ones, I have chosen to call them 
preparatory measures. The meaning with these is not to convict infringers but 
rather make it more difficult, if not impossible, for them to infringe the trademark.  
Court procedures can be a costly matter that some might not afford, therefore it is 
necessary to have some preparatory measures available to protect the marks. 
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Initiating a procedure against an alleged infringer is not an issue, but making an 
undertaking the proprietor of your trademark in another Member State through a 
license agreement, thus giving him the right to initiate procedures against 
infringers is, or at least was. 
As an example, we have Consten & Grundig
108
. Though they were ruled to 
hinder parallel trade, it was not the fact that they initiated any procedure against 
an alleged infringer that got them convicted. The problem lied with the agreement 
between Consten and Grundig allowing one party to register and become the 
proprietor of the other party‟s trademark in another Member State. This was 
considered an act of hindering parallel trade, most likely since it creates an 
extension of the IPR. Instead of one company keeping a lookout for potential 
infringements you now have two that can focus on their own national market and 
thus expanding the protection.  
Another action belonging to this category of preparatory measures is imposing 
rules and limitations to retailers selling the trademarked goods. As will be 
discussed further down in chapter 4.3, these actions can also cause issues for the 
proprietor when competition law gets involved.  
Proprietors will find different ways of protecting the trademark. Protecting 
yourself against confusion is as stated earlier the core of the defensive protection 
but it means that an infringement must occur before the procedure can be initiated.  
Though basic protection against confusion safeguards the exclusive link between 
an enterprise and its trademark and offers legal security for substantial investment 
in the evocation of brand-related associations in the minds of consumers,
109
 it is 
not enough. 
There is a need for preparatory measures if the counterfeiting is going to be 
defeated and it should be in the CJEU‟s interest to promote these and not increase 
the limitation the proprietors, however this is not the reality so far.   
 
2.7 Concluding comment 
Reflecting the judgment in Consten & Grundig, I begin to wonder if it is 
necessary to rule that allowing the licensee to register the proprietor‟s trademark 
in another Member State is hindering parallel trade. With the principle of 
exhaustion in mind, does the fact that the proprietor of the trademark is dependent 
on what nation you choose, in this case Consten in France and Grundig in 
Germany, affect the trade any more than if the proprietor is the same undertaking 
for both? 
Yes, Consten was able to prevent importation of goods bearing the mark GINT 
into the French market, but this is something that the legislation permits as long as 
the use is unauthorized. In this case, the goods were put on the market of the 
Union since they legally where marketed by Grundig or its subsidiaries. 
Therefore, with the ruling of the CJEU in Deutsche Grammophon
110
 in mind, the 
actions of Consten and Grundig would not necessarily constitute a hindering of 
parallel trade more than a proprietor of a trademark already does. The only 
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difference is that the „original‟ proprietor will have some aid in the fight against 
counterfeited products. Thus it is perhaps appropriate to clarify what is allowed. I 
interpret Consten & Grundig in the light of Deutsche Grammophon meaning that, 
it is appropriate for a licensor to license a right to register a trademark, which is 
his in one Member State, to a licensee in another Member State and the licensee 
should be granted a proprietor‟s protection. Thus, able prevent any third parties 
from importing and selling goods bearing the said mark, as long as that mark has 
not been put on the market in the Union by the original proprietor, or with his 
consent. 
25 
 
3 New Regulation and Directive 
revising the TMR and TMD. 
On March 23 2013, the Commission published the proposals for a new Regulation 
and Directive that will amend the TMR and the TMD.
111
 The Following Chapter 
will take a look at the proposed amendments that is concerning the rights and 
limitations of a trademark.  
 
3.1 Proposed Regulation amendments 
The new regulation will not reform the legislation to a point beyond 
recognition. The main reasons for its creation are efficiency and budgetary but 
also to increase the legal certainty.
112
 A study has shown that almost all 
applications for a „Community trademark‟ have been made directly through the 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) and not through the 
national offices. Based on those facts the Commission is proposing that the option 
for application through national offices should be removed.
113
 Other changes that 
are proposed are the name change of „Community trademark‟ to „European 
Trademark‟ and the name of OHIM will be changed to „European Union 
Trademarks and Designs Agency‟.114 
There are several changes suggested in order to increase the legal certainty. For 
instance, the requirement for a graphic „representability‟ laid down in Article 4 of 
the TMR is removed due to being “out of date”. It is explained that the legal 
certainty is suffering because of this graphic „representability‟ requirement since it 
is excluding e.g. sound recordings, which according to the commission, is 
preferred in some cases since it can be identified more easily and thus it would 
serve the legal certainty good to allow registration of such marks. Further, the 
removal of graphical representation would make it possible to register „marks‟ 
that can be represented by means of technology offering “satisfactory 
guarantees”.115 However, the Commission is emphasizing that the new article will 
not be a boundless extension of representation alternatives but rather create more 
flexibility in the admissible ways to represent a sign thus generating greater legal 
certainty.  
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The protection laid down in Article 7 of the TMR shall be amended to offer the 
same degree of protection granted by other EU-legislation on the matter of marks 
indicating geographical origin and quality.
116
 The negative right granted to the 
proprietor of a „European trademark‟ by Article 9 of the TMR will be altered and 
include a clarification of the fact that the infringement claims cannot be invoked 
against the use of identical or similar marks which has been registered earlier, 
making the Article correspond with Article 16(1) of the TRIPS-Agreement. 
The Commission suggests that „trade name‟ use of a protected trademark 
should be considered as an act of infringement if the criteria for „use of goods or 
services‟ are met. The reason is that the CJEU ruled in Céline117 that Article 5(1) 
of the TMD is applicable in cases where the public considers the use of an 
undertakings name as relating to the goods or services offered by the undertaking. 
In order to further strengthen the legal certainty of Article 9 of the TMR and 
article 5 of the TMD the Commission proposes that in cases of double identity and 
similarity the origin function of the matter to establish infringement. The new 
Regulation might get a provision that will allow a proprietor to prevent the use of 
his trademark in comparing advertisements, if the use does not satisfy the 
requirements found in Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC
118
. 
It is also possible that the proprietor will be able to hinder the importation of 
goods from outside the EU that have been sold, advertised, offered or shipped to 
private consumers in the EU. As long as the consignor (shipper) is acting for 
commercial purposes, whether located in the EU or not does not matter, the 
proprietor will have the right to prevent the importation of infringing goods and to 
discourage the ordering and sale of counterfeit products over the internet.
119
 
It is emphasized that, the legislation should be altered to make it easier for the 
proprietor to hinder third parties from bringing in goods that without authorization 
bare marks identical to an EU trademark from third countries, in order to 
efficiently fight against counterfeiting. This is a result of the CJEU‟s decision in 
Philips/Nokia
120
 where it was said that goods imported from third countries could 
only be classified as counterfeit once it could be proven that they were to be sold 
or advertised to consumers of the EU. This judgement has met strong criticism 
from stakeholders arguing that the CJEU has put an inappropriately high burden 
of proof on the proprietors thus hindering the fight against counterfeiting.
121
  
It will also be included a rule in the new Regulation and Directive that allows 
proceedings against distribution and sales of labels and packaging or similar, 
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which may be combined with unlawful products. Inspiration has been taken from 
national laws that contain such provisions, and the Commission sees it as an 
efficient contribution to the battle against counterfeiting.
122
  
It is still going to take some time before this proposal will enter into effect and 
some of these amendments might not be in the final draft. However, it is positive 
news for right holders that the legislator is taking steps making the protection for 
the trademarks stronger. There will be stronger defensive measures that can be 
taken in order to prevent counterfeit products entering the EU-market and a more 
dynamic and flexible „representability‟ requirement, which should be up to speed 
with today‟s modern world. Concerns could be raised though, against the 
possibility of attempting to trademark mere sound recordings. Though it is true 
that a simple jingle or short musical number can be relatable to certain products 
for customers, it might perhaps be necessary to limit this right, in order to prevent 
a possible ownership dispute between an undertaking and a musical group that 
composed and performed a sound recording that through the commercial were 
presented to the public. On the other hand, this new amendment, if ever drafted, 
will create opportunities for undertakings to hire musicians to compose a 
trademark for them thus creating a new income market for artists and other in the 
music industry.   
3.2 Proposed Directive amendments 
Due to the changing market, the Commission also sees that in order to provide 
a higher level of legal certainty the legislations of the Member States needs to be 
altered in order to be more in line with the new Regulation. The proposed 
Directive is driven by the objective of increasing the legal certainty through 
clarifying the provisions by alter their scope and limitations. The proposal 
contains new and altered rules, which will make the Directive correspond with the 
provisions in the Regulation.  
Just as with the proposal for the new Regulation, the Commission plans to 
remove the requirement on graphical representation in order to make the 
legislation more modern and flexible. The same concerns the provisions 
preventing proprietors from invoking their rights against identical signs that are 
subject to a prior right making it correspond with the TRIPS-Agreement.
123
 As 
mentioned above there will be changes to the TMD‟s Article 5 making it clear that 
in cases of double identity and similarity it is the origin function that will 
determine whether there is an infringement or not, regardless if the case concerns 
a reputed trademark or not. There will also be an adding of a provision, stating 
that unauthorized use of an undertaking‟s name will also constitute an act of 
infringement, since trade names can be associated with the products they provide 
and therefore could constitute a likelihood of confusion.
124
 
The provision allowing a proprietor to prevent the use of his mark in 
comparative advertisements as long as it is considered damaging the marks 
reputation, which was laid down in the proposed Regulation, can also be found in 
this proposal. The same is for the provision allowing a proprietor to prevent 
                                                 
122
  Ibid. 
123
  Proposed Directive, pp. 5-6 and 18. 
124
  Proposed Directive, pp. 6 and 19. 
28 
 
businesses, EU or non-EU, from importing counterfeited goods located outside 
the EU that have been sold, offered advertised or shipped to private consumers 
even when it is only the consignor that is acting for commercial purposes.  
The provision, found in the proposed Regulation, allowing the proprietor to 
prevent third parties from bringing goods, bearing an identical mark as his 
trademark, without authorization from third countries into the Union, regardless of 
whether they are released for free circulation, is also found in the proposed 
Directive. The new provision allowing proprietors to initiate proceedings against 
distribution and sale of packaging and labels similar to their trademarks that 
contain unlawful products, is also proposed to be added in the TMD in order to 
aid in the fight against counterfeiting.   
As mentioned above there is need for a distinctive character in order to benefit 
from trademark protection. The proposed Directive is suggesting adding, in the 
TMD‟s sixth Article, an extension of the provision limiting the effects of a 
trademark. This means that the proprietor will not be able to invoke his rights 
against use of non-distinctive signs, indications or even referential use of his 
sign.
125
 
Article 4 and 5 of the TMD will be altered in order to increase the legal 
certainty for trademarks with a reputation. The proposed Decision‟s fifth and tenth 
article will not suggest that the Member States provides a more extensive 
protection for famous trademarks but rather make it mandatory for them do to 
so.
126
 Further, it is proposed that the new TMD should address trademarks as 
objects of property and contain provisions regarding aspects of its exploitation 
such as transfer or right in rem. It will then be part of the legislations of the 
Member States that a trademark right can be transferred and also there will be 
extensions of the provision regarding licensing a trademark right. The 
Commission proposes that the licensee shall by law, have a right to initiate 
procedures against an alleged infringer if the proprietor allows it or after an 
appropriate period, if the proprietor is reluctant to do so and a formal notice has 
been given.
127
  
What marks that are considered as a trademark will be extended to also include 
„Collective marks‟ and „Guarantee or Certification marks‟.128 The reason for this 
is that the Members of the Union have different legislation on the matter and thus 
it is provided protection for these marks in some countries and not in others. 
Therefore, the Commission wants to set some provisions regarding registration 
and protection of these marks.
129
  
3.3 Concluding comment 
To summarize, it looks like the proposed amendments for the TMR will 
generate a more secure protection for European trademarks and perhaps open up a 
new market for the music industry. Proprietors might then get it easier to use their 
defensive measures in order to fend of infringers and free riders from using their 
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mark on counterfeited goods and reputation wrecking advertisements, while 
preparatory measures‟ legality seems to continue being an uncertainty. 
The proposed amendments for the TMD will generate more protection for 
proprietors just like with the proposed Regulation. It seems like the Commission 
have found a balance though when put in some limitations as well. The limitations 
for non-distinctive marks is clearly in line with what the CJEU already have ruled 
in a number of cases, as stated above. Regarding the referential use, this provision 
has to be handled with caution. Although there is a directive regarding 
„comparative advertisement‟130, this provision could be used by alleged infringers 
as protection when using a trademark in an advertisement. There is a provision 
that is stating that third parties use, is not accepted if it is not in accordance with 
honest practise. Such use is described as e.g. when the third party takes unfair 
advantage of a marks reputation or is detrimental to it for no reason.
131
 This is 
however a bit vague for my taste and I would rather see that there should be a 
more clear set of rules regarding referential use or a prohibition of it all together in 
order to prevent any possible harm being caused a trademark. 
It is positive that the Commission acknowledge the importance for a Union 
wide more extensive protection for trademarks with a reputation. Even though it is 
very likely that most Member States already have a more extensive protection set 
by it legislations, it will now be mandatory and a guarantee for proprietors even in 
the future with new states joining the Union.  
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4 Case Law 
As the title states this chapter of the thesis will present the case law chosen in 
order to examine measures trademark proprietors are allowed to take without 
being hindered by competition law. The list is not exhaustive and the thought is to 
give the reader insight in the CJEUs rulings regarding the limits of preparatory 
trademark protection. 
 
4.1 BAT 
In BAT
132
 the CJEU set the standard that trademark law should not be used 
improperly to undermine the European Union Law. 
 
Background 
BAT was the proprietor of the trademark “Dorcet” which was registered in 
Germany for tobacco products but never used commercially. BAT opposed the 
registration of the trademark “Toltec” belonging to the undertaking Segers. After 
negotiations Segers signed an agreement with BAT regarding specification of his 
application without challenging BAT‟s registration due to a non-use of its mark. 
Both marks concerns tobacco products and the agreement stated that the use of the 
“Toltec” mark should not be opposed by BAT as long as it was used for curly cut 
tobacco (pipe tobacco). There was nothing preventing Segers from using the 
“Toltec” mark for fine cut tobacco (for rolling cigarettes) but BAT was then not 
obliged to refrain from opposing the use.
133
 
When the parties later disagrees about the definition of the products covered by 
the agreement Segers, not being able to afford a costly litigation with BAT, stops 
using the trademark and complains to the Commission, arguing that BAT is 
infringing Article 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The Commission adopts an investigation and finds that BAT through the 
agreement have infringed Article 101(1) TFEU.
134
 The decision was challenged 
by BAT and ended up before the CJEU. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General 
The AG agreed with the Commission and argued that the agreement prevented 
Segers from importing fine cut tobacco without the consent of BAT and prevented 
him from claiming any rights against BAT‟s opposition of the registration and use 
of the “Toltec” mark. He had also trouble seeing, just as the Commission, that 
there was any likelihood of confusion between the two marks.
135
 He Argued that 
whatever interest BAT may have had in protecting an inactive trademark, there 
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was no justification for restricting Segers' liberty to choose to whom he wished to 
deal, interfering in the business relations between Segers and its importers or for 
requiring Segers to take back stock held by one of its importers. AG Slynn 
considered that such restrictions may be appropriate in a distribution agreement or 
a licensing agreement in the true sense but, taken as a whole, went beyond a 
simple compromise in a trademark dispute and amounted to a prevention or 
restriction of competition.
136
 
Slynn‟s considers that BAT‟s objection is unfounded and that his claim for 
annulment of the Commission‟s Decision should be rejected.137  
 
Decision of the CJEU 
The CJEU started with investigating what the agreement concerned. It found the 
agreement to be objectively ambiguous which was a result of Segers‟ suggestion, 
however, it felt that BAT took an advantage of this ambiguity in order to prevent 
Segers from marketing the tobacco he manufactured, fine cut tobacco. The curly 
cut tobacco that Seger could market was not even produced by him. BAT argued 
that the agreement was a “delimitation” agreement which contained a no-
challenge clause which intended to consolidate the position of the “Dorcet” mark 
even after it had ceased to be legally protected.
138
 The German government 
supported the general argument of BAT that there was a real risk of confusion 
between the marks since they were phonetically similar. It also emphasized the 
importance of these “delimitation” agreements in the course of trademark law. It 
was, according to the government of Germany, an important part in preventing 
legal disputes enabling proprietors to define the extent of their respective rights by 
amicable agreement.  A delimitation based on the goods involved is the 
foundation of nearly all such agreements. The same applies to so-called 'no-
challenge' or 'priority' clauses, which are also typically included in such 
agreements. The validity of such agreements should be governed by national law 
according to the German government. 
The CJEU accepted that “delimitation” agreements are lawful and useful if 
they serve to restrict the spheres within which the parties trademarks may be used 
in order to avoid confusion or conflict between them and as long as it is the 
mutual interest of the parties. However, as long as the agreement also has the aim 
of dividing the market or restricting competition in other ways the agreement will 
fall under the scope of Article 101 TFEU.
139
 The court referred to its judgment in 
Consten & Grundig
140
 where it stated that the competition law of the Union does 
not allow the improper use of rights under any national trademark law in order to 
frustrate the Union law on cartels.
141
 The CJEU states that BAT‟s efforts to 
control the distribution of Segers‟ products constitute an abuse of the rights 
conferred by its trademark ownership. 
The CJEU ruled that the agreement was in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU 
since it affected the trade between Member States and served no other purpose 
than making it possible for BAT to control Segers‟ marketing. It also ruled that no 
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exemption could be granted in accordance with Article 101(3) TFEU since the 
agreement was not contributing to any improvement of the distribution of tobacco 
and it was hindering Segers from marketing his product.
142
  
 
Discussion 
The reasoning of AG Slynn amounts to an indication to some limitations that a 
proprietor would be able to inflict upon its licensees. I can also relate to the wish 
to protect a trademark that is not used. It is possible that a mark is registered well 
before it is actually launched, in order to be assured that someone else does not 
register it. It would also be understandable that the proprietor in this case would 
want to ensure that the mark is not infringed, by using a delimitation agreement as 
in this case. I do however agree with the CJEU that BAT went over the line in this 
case. In the way the agreement was structured it was not proportionate in order to 
protect the trademark. Whether there was any actual risk of the marks being 
confused with each other, was a national matter. The German court stated that the 
marks sounded similar which in my opinion depends on whom you are asking. In 
the German tongue, it is possible for confusion while I cannot hear a resemblance.  
Although the CJEU limits the trademark right in this case, I consider that the 
measures taken by BAT to be excessive. It would have been good though if the 
reasoning regarding license agreements would have been put forward by the 
CJEU. 
4.2 BMW v Deenik 
In BMW v Deenik
143
, the CJEU deals with the limitations of a trademark‟s 
rights in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the TMD.  
 
Background 
In the Benelux BMW is the registered proprietor of the BMW trademark that 
consists of the acronym BMW and two figurative trademarks. The mark covers 
motor vehicles, spare parts and accessories. BMW‟s cars were marketed through a 
network of dealers, which are selected if fulfilling requirements, laid down to 
ensure that the dealers met BMW´s standard. Ronald Karel Deenik (Deenik) ran a 
repair shop where he specialized on repairing BMWs and trading second-hand 
BMWs. In some advertisements, Deenik had stated that he repairs and performed 
maintenance of BMW. BMW initiated a procedure before Dutch court, stating that 
Deenik was infringing its trademark. The court ruled that even though the use of 
the BMW marks could make the impression that Deenik was part of the BMW 
dealer‟s network, Deenik was allowed to use statements such as the one 
mentioned above and he could state that he was a Specialist in BMWs since it 
only refers to products bearing the BMW mark. The court of Appeal came to the 
same conclusion and the case ended up before the Hoge Raad (the referring 
court), which decided to stay the proceedings and referred several questions to the 
CEJU. 
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The second question concerned, if the unauthorized use of a trademark in 
advertisements for the purpose to inform the public of the alleged user‟s business 
of repair and maintenance of, or that he is a specialist, on the trademarked 
products, which have been put on the market by the proprietor or with his consent, 
constitute use of a trademark as defined by Article 5 of the TMD? 
The third question asked if there is a difference between using the trademark 
for announcing repairs and maintenance of the trademarked products and 
announcing that he is a specialist on the trademarked products? 
In its fourth question the referring court asked whether application of the 
provision in Article 7 of the TMD is dependent on which of the paragraphs of 
Article 5 of the same directive the alleged use would be submitted to. 
If the CJEU would rule that there was a use of the trademark in this case the 
referring court asked if the proprietor can prevent that use only where the person 
is using the trademark and creates the impression that his undertaking is affiliated 
to the trademark proprietor's network, or can the proprietor also prevent that use 
where there is a good chance that in the manner the trademark is used for creates 
an impression among the public that the trademark is used for the purpose of 
advertising the users business as such by creating a specific suggestion of 
quality?
144
 
 
Opinion of Advocate General 
On the second question, AG Jacobs noticed that the trademark was not 
registered for the services relating to the products for which the mark had been 
registered and thus the use had to be examined both for goods and for services. He 
emphasised that the court should not give guidance to the specific wording at 
issue but rather on the applicable principles.
145 
AG Jacobs finds that both the 
advertisements regarding the sale of second-hand BMWs and the repairs and 
maintenance of BMWs constitute use of trademark for goods under article 5(1)(a) 
since it is describing what can be repaired and serviced and is thus used „in 
relation to‟ the cars rather than Deenik‟s service.146  
However, Jacobs believes that the reseller should be free to make use of a 
trademark in order to bring attention to the public regarding the further 
commercialisation of the goods and the proprietor cannot oppose this unless it is 
seriously damaging to the trademark or its reputation.
147
 This was stated by the 
CJEU in Dior
148
 and means that BMW‟s trademark right has been exhausted 
according to Article 7(1) of the TMD and BMW can only prevent Deenik‟s use if 
it is damaging his mark according to Article 7(2) of the same directive. In the end, 
this was for the national court to decide.
149
  
For the use of the trademark relating to services, Jacobs states that it is possible 
that the use regarding repair and maintenance could fall under Article 5(1)(b) of 
the TMD. It is for the national court to assess the likelihood of confusion 
according to the case law of the CJEU. Jacobs states that, the fact that resellers 
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derives advantage from the trademark and the mark‟s aura of quality gives him a 
high quality image it is not sufficient for applying article 5(1)(b), if there is an 
absence of such likelihood of confusion as mentioned above.
150
 
Jacobs states that it is possible to apply Article 5(2) on the use but that it again 
is for the national court to determine. He does however believe that it is unlikely 
that the application is possible since, it would be difficult to consider 
advertisement of a legitimate economic activity as use of the trademark without 
due cause or that the use would be detrimental to the mark.
151
 
The same unlikeliness was considered with Article 5(5) since it just as 5(2) 
requires the use to be without due cause.
152
 
Without the question being asked by the referring court, Jacobs discussed the 
application of Article 6.1 of the TMD since it was raised by BMW some 
observing governments and the Commission in a response to a question put by the 
CJEU.
153
 Article 6(1)(c) states that the proprietor cannot limit the use of a third 
party if the use is considered necessary in order for him to indicate the intended 
purpose of his service and BMW argued that Deenik‟s use was not necessary.  
Even though this is matter for the national court, AG Jacobs stated his view on 
the matter and considered that since Deenik specialized in BMWs it would be 
very difficult for him to, efficiently, communicate that fact to his customers 
without using the BMW signs. That Deenik benefits from the use of the sign was 
not the issue, the issue was to what extent a trader in his position should be free to 
describe the nature of the services he is providing. Unless the use of the trademark 
would confuse the public to believe that Deenik was an authorized BMW 
dealer/mechanic and that his use of the mark would not be considered honest 
practice in commercial matter, BMW cannot prevent the use according to Article 
6(1)(c). To merely derive advantage from use of a mark is not contrary to article 
6(1)(c) of the TMD.
154
 
Regarding the referring court‟s last question on quality Jacobs stated that, if 
there is no likelihood that the public would be confused to believe that there was 
some sort of trade connection between Deenik and BMW there is no legitimate 
reason for BMW to invoke Article 7(2) of the TMD against Deenik‟s 
advertisements. The fact that a reseller obtains an advantage by using the 
trademark because the sale of the marked goods gives his business an aura of 
quality is not a legitimate reason for the proprietor to object the advertising of his 
goods. If it would, traders would have an immense problem to, efficiently, inform 
the public of his business.
155
 
 
Decision of the CJEU 
Before discussing the questions regarding Article 5, 6 and 7, the CJEU stated 
that deciding what provision under Article 5 of the TMD the use would fall under 
it would not determine whether the use is permissible.
156
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The CJEU found that the trademark was only registered for goods. The Court 
ruled that the use of the trademark for the purpose of informing the public of 
Deenik‟s business of repairing and maintenance BMWs or that he is a specialist 
on BMWs constitute such use for goods within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of 
the TMD. That conclusion came through looking at the applicability of Article 
5(1), 5(2) and 5(5) of the TMD and their applicability depended on whether the 
trademark was used for the purpose of distinguishing the goods from one 
undertaking from another or if the purpose is for something else. Since the use of 
BMW in Deenik‟s advertisements is to distinguish that he performs services or 
repairs on those types of cars rather than others, he is distinguishing the goods and 
thus is using the mark for goods.
157
 
The provisions in Article 5(2) or 5(5) TMD only becomes available when the 
use of a trademark is equal to taking advantage of, or harming, the trademarks 
reputation by e.g. making the public believe that there is a relationship between 
the user and the proprietor. In these situations, account should only be taken to 
these matters when assessing the use‟s legality and not when classifying the use. 
The court concludes that the use is „in the course of trade‟ under Article 5(3) 
TMD and can be prohibited by Article 5(1) and 5(2) TMD.
158
 
The court distinguished a difference between the use of the trademark for 
adverts regarding repairs and sales of second-hand cars in order to determine 
whether the use is allowed under Article 6 and 7 TMD. 
Regarding the use for selling second-hand BMWs adverts, the CJEU states that 
as long as the adverts concerns cars that are put on the market by BMW or with its 
consent, BMW cannot oppose the use of its mark unless it is damaging to its 
reputation. If the advertisements would confuse the public to believe that Deenik 
was part of the BMW dealer network or that the two undertakings have a special 
relationship, BMW could be able to invoke Article 7(2). The CJEU bases its 
ruling on its decision in the earlier Dior case where it stated that for marks with a 
reputation, the reseller using the mark has to make sure that his advertisements 
does not harm the marks prestigious image and that he does not act unfairly in 
relation to the legitimate interests of the proprietor.  
So if the trademark right is exhausted but the use harms or takes unfair 
advantage of the trademark‟s reputation or if the reseller is not act fairly in 
relation to the legitimate interests of the proprietor thus violating the subject 
matter of the proprietor‟s trademark right, the resellers use could be opposed by 
the proprietor.
159
 The CJEU concluded that since Deenik is a specialist on BMWs 
he could not communicate this fact to his customers without using the BMW mark 
and it was for the national court to decide if the advertisements make the 
impression of a commercial connection between BMW and him, if there would be 
then BMW could oppose the use. The use was deemed necessary to guarantee the 
right of resale under Article 7 and it does not take unfair advantage of the mark‟s 
reputation.
160
  
As for the advertisements regarding repairs and maintenance of BMWs the 
CJEU stated that the principle of exhaustion does not apply since the adverts does 
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not affect the further commercialisation of the cars.
161
 The court looked at whether 
the use could be legitimate under article 6(1)(c) TMD and took the same view as 
AG Jacobs, that it would not be possible for Deenik to communicate his business 
to consumers without using the BMW trademark. The conclusion for the repair 
and maintenance adverts was that it is acceptable as long as it complies with the 
conditions set for the adverts for resale of BMWs, like acting fairly in relation to 
the legitimate interest of the proprietor, confusion of origin and taking unfair 
advantage of the trademark‟s reputation.  
 
Discussion 
As with BAT
162
 I agree with the reasoning of AG and the CJEU. Unlike the 
situation in Dior the advertisement is unlikely to damage the trademark. It is 
perhaps not desirable that others can get attention due to the trademarks reputation 
and thus the marks qualitative aura rubs off on the user, the CJEU finds no 
problem with this. I can see that it would depend on the likelihood of confusion. If 
it would be possible to believe that Deenik was a part of the BMW dealer network 
then it would be a different matter. Perhaps the investigation needed to go further 
in order to look into the possibility that Deenik‟s facilities did not damage the 
mark. Let‟s say that Deenik is believed to be a member of the BMW dealer 
network, through his advertisements. It is not necessarily the advertisements that 
then harms the trademark but rather his facilities that are not up to the standards as 
BMW customers would expect and thus he could be considered damaging the 
image of BMW. 
Since the advertisements are a description of Deenik‟s business, I consider it as 
too excessive protection if BMW would have been allowed to prevent him from 
using their name. I do not think use of the logo is acceptable though, the word 
BMW has to be used to describe the cars sold or repaired, but the logo is not 
necessary for that purpose and should not be allowed to be used. The CJEU 
should make a distinction between the use of the trademark and the logo that 
belongs to it. The trademark name could then be used in descriptive 
advertisements but the logo should not be used without authorization since it is 
more likely to cause confusion.  
4.3 Der Grüne Punkt 
In Der Grüne Punkt
163
 the CJEU dealt with the abuse of a dominant position in 
connection with the function of a trademark. The CJEU had to consider whether 
Duales Systems Deutschland (DSD) could rely on the trademark logo to justify 
the fee taken for its use by others.  
 
Background 
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German law required that manufacturers and distributors of packaging took 
back the packaging they had placed on the German market.
164
 DSD provided a 
service which manufacturers could use in order to be exempted from the law by 
placing DSD‟s registered trademark Der Grüne Punkt (DGP) on their packaging. 
This “exemption system” meant that DSD would recover, collect and sort the 
packaging in return for a fee that would cover the costs including administrative 
and the members of the system would not have to self-manage the collecting of 
the packaging. 
The exemption system covered all of Germany through subcontractors and the 
membership was established through standard trademark license agreement 
covering the use of the logo and the corresponding fee was calculated on the basis 
of the weight and volume of the packaging and the type of material it consisted of.  
During a procedure before the Commission DSD pointed out that it used 
measurers assuring that, users of alternative exemption systems or that self-
managed their packaging would not have to pay the fee, but it required evidence 
that the packaging would be recovered. There were some licensees that used 
alternative systems for some of the packaging and if showing proof that the 
packaging would be taken care of not fee needed to be paid. 
The Commission stated that DSD was in a dominant position collecting 70% of 
the sale packaging in Germany and 82% of the packaging collected from end-
consumers. In the view of the Commission the fee was not based upon the actual 
use of DSD‟s system. It was actually calculated on the number of packages 
bearing the DGP trademark put on the German market. Based on these facts the 
Commission drew the conclusion that the method used for calculating the fee was 
an obstacle for the desire those packaging manufacturers who wants to use DSD‟s 
system for some of its packaging and another, or its own solution, for the rest. 
This obstacle constituted an abuse of DSD‟s dominant position and the solution 
provided for by DSD, that the manufacturers should not put the DGP logo on the 
packaging not covered by DSD‟s system, was considered economically 
unrealistic. This solution would demand selective labeling which constitutes 
“considerable” additional costs and it would require that the manufacturers and 
distributors using “mixed systems” ensured that the packaging without the DGP 
logo were disposed in places where the other system provider could collect it, 
which according to the commission would be impossible in practice. It was 
considered impossible to know where the end-consumer would dispose of the 
packaging after using it and the Commission held that it would be impossible to 
determine the correct quantity of packaging that should be marked with the DGP 
trademark.
165
  
The said abuse was considered to be exploitative, by imposing unfair terms and 
prices on the users of DSD‟s system, and obstructive, by effectively preventing 
DSD‟s customers from using alternative systems and was not considered to be 
objectively justified under trademark law, because DSD's system went beyond 
what was necessary to fulfill the essential function of the trademark right, which 
in this case was to indicate to consumers that they could dispose of the packaging 
through DSD‟s system. DSD was therefore ordered to not charge a license fee for 
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packaging which the manufacturer collected and recycled in some other way. The 
fee was considered to be likely to appreciably affect the trade between Member 
States.
166
 
DSD appealed the decision to the GC but the appeal was rejected and the case 
ended up before the CJEU  
 
Opinion of Advocate General 
AG Bot followed the GC‟s reasoning stating that the DGP logo had an 
economic value and just placing the mark on packaging was likely to have a price 
however there had to be made a distinction between the fee that covered costs 
associated with the actual use of the system and a fictional fee just covering the 
use of the DGP logo.
167
 
Bot argued that the fee was abusive while the requirement that the 
manufacturer or distributor wishing to use DSD‟s system had to fix the DGP logo 
to each piece of notified packaging was not. The reason was that in some cases the 
fee was charged even for packaging that was taken back by a competitor‟s 
system.
168
 He agreed with the GC stating that the DGP logo had no relationship 
with the trademark agreement but rather an identifying role and informed the 
consumer what he had to do with the packaging.
169
 
 The function of the logo meant that it could co-exist with other logos allowing 
the manufacturers or distributors to participate in other exemption systems, 
according to Bot this meant that the Commission‟s decision did not constitute a 
disproportionate deficiency of the trademark right or damage which is not justified 
by the need to prevent an abuse of a dominant position in accordance with article 
102.
170
 
DSD argued that the coexistence would be confusing to consumers since there 
would be contradictory information appearing on the packaging. Further it was 
argued that if the packaging not disposed of by DSD‟s system was allowed to 
carry the DGP logo there was a risk that the logo would lose its distinctiveness 
and that by not being able to benefit from the exclusivity of its mark the GC had 
infringed trademark law.
171
  
AG Bot went on the GC reasoning that the trademark agreement concerned 
manufactures and distributors of packaging rather than consumers and that the 
cumulative marking would mean that DSD and another system could be applied 
for the same piece of packaging. Also Bot considered that the GC had not 
infringed trademark law.
172
 
Looking at the effect of trademark law Bot considered that the specific object 
of trademark law was to guarantee the owner the exclusive right to prevent third 
parties from using identical signs. However, in this case the undertakings using 
DSD‟s system for parts of their packaging or those marketed in another Member 
State could not be regarded as competitors of DSD or as third parties improperly 
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selling goods covered by the DGP logo.
173
 The essential function of the DGP logo 
was to ensure that the packaging baring it could be taken back by DSD. If it had 
meant that the packaging was recyclable so consumers could have based its 
product selection on it, the mark would have followed the scheme of trademarks 
but in this it was not like a normal trademark that allows consumers to choose 
between products.
174
 
Regarding the abuse AG Bot, just like the GC, contrary to DSD considered that 
the decision of the Commission did not amount to a compulsory license but 
mainly required DSD not to charge a fee on the total amount of packaging bearing 
tis logo where it is shown that some of that packaging has been taken care of by 
another system.
175
 Bot also stated that there was no need to add a note which 
would neutralize the DGP logo, in order to prevent products bearing double logos 
ending up in its system, was not proportionate since the behavior of consumers is 
unpredictable and thus the note would be irrelevant.
176
 The last part can be 
explained as meaning that the note would not ensure that a packaging bearing it 
would not end up in DSD‟s system since a consumer might not care where he 
disposes of the packaging. 
 
Decision of the CJEU 
The CJEU started with the first plea and considered that DSD‟s might be 
taking a fee for the use of its logo was one issue and the fee charged for the 
packaging actually taken back was another. The CJEU considered that the 
Commission and the GC had not committed any errors when ruling that the 
calculation of the fee was abusive.
177
 The CJEU also held that the affixing of 
logos of other exemption systems alongside the DGP logo does not go against the 
principle of transparency, contrary to DSD‟s claim. The CJEU argued that the 
DGP logo basically notifies consumers and the relevant authority that the 
packaging will not have to be brought back to the point of sale or in the area 
around them, consumers will not know which system that will collect the 
packaging, but DSD will know.
178
  
As for the use of the trademark through the agreement the CJEU discussed the 
invocation of Article 5 of the TMD and found that it does not concern use by third 
parties with consent from the proprietor. It would however be possible for DSD to 
invoke Article 8 TMD arguing that the licensee is breaching the license agreement 
due to its use. However since DSD itself set up the system and demanded that all 
packaging notified to it wore its trademark, even those that were not collected by 
DSD, in the license agreement the licensee‟s did not breach the agreement but 
rather followed it.
 179 
 
The CJEU did not consider the Commission‟s decision leading to an imposing 
of a partial free use of the DGP logo.  DSD argued that the decision is diminishing 
the trademark right granted by the TMD, while the CJEU considered that the 
decision is mainly preventing DSD from charging a fee for a service that is not 
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provided and this is not in violation of the TMD. Further the CJEU stated that the 
decisions of the Commission and GC do not allow third parties, who are not in an 
agreement with DSD, to use its trademark and there is nothing preventing DSD to 
initiate proceedings against such infringement.
180
 
As for the abuse of DSD‟s dominance the CJEU cited its ruling in British 
Leyland
181
 where it stated that the charging of a fee for its services which does not 
correspond to the value of those services constitutes abuse of a dominant 
position.
182
 The charging of a fee for a service that was not provided should be 
considered equal to such abuse.
183
 DSD considered that the Commission and the 
GC imposed a compulsory license through the decisions. The CJEU considered 
that the obligation on DSD, set by the Commission and confirmed by the GC, to 
not charge a fee for quantities of packaging bearing its logo put on the German 
market but for which DSD‟s service was not used and fulfilled in another way, did 
not constitute a compulsory license. The decision would not affect DSD‟s 
freedom to choose the parties with which it entered into an agreement, it was 
simply a consequence of the finding of an abuse of a dominant position and the 
Commission exercising its power in order to end the infringement.
184
  
DSD considers that the decisions of the Commission and the GC to reject the 
enforcement of placing a note on packaging, not intended to be processed by 
DSD‟s system, thus neutralizing the distinctive effect of the trademark, violates 
the principle of proportionality laid down by Article 3 of Regulation no 
17/62
185
.The CJEU agreed with AG Bot and the GC that it would be impossible to 
make a distinction between the packaging bearing the logo that would be 
processed by the DSD system and the ones being processed by a mixed or self-
managed system. So the explanatory note would be useless since it was 
impossible to determine which route an item of packaging would follow in 
advance, therefore the CJEU considered that there was no infringement of the 
principle of proportionality.
186
 
 
Discussion 
I understand the worries of DSD in this case. The mark is associated with a 
duty to collect packaging, however, the fee is not calculated properly. Perhaps if 
the fee were to be fixed and set to different levels, meaning that the members of 
its system would have some margins to work within when choosing the amount of 
products to be included under DSD‟s system would not have generated the same 
negative decision of the CJEU. It is likely that a smaller undertaking would have 
been able to use the same provision in an identical agreement. If an exemption 
service provider is allowed to base the fee on the actual number of packaging 
covered by the system it would be able to calculated the cost of collecting the 
packaging and perhaps the fee would be lower than if it should be one fixed fee 
for just membership. A lower fee would be appreciated by smaller undertakings. 
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However, the reasoning of the court is understandable, since it would be illogical 
to allow a fee to be taken for products that would not be collected. Although a fee 
taken for products that is not in need of being collected is very similar. The 
conflict of competition and trademark is quite clear, however, as the court states 
the trademark is not having the effect of a normal trademark. A mark usually 
identifies a product‟s origin, while DGP just states that the product can be 
collected by DSD. It does not affect the purchase of a regular consumer like Coca-
Cola or Pepsi. The CJEU have stated that there exists a different type of 
trademarks that has a different effect and perhaps then are subjected to different 
limitations. 
 
 
4.4 Pierre Fabre 
The case Pierre Fabre
187
 concerns a clause in a selective distribution agreement 
that constitutes a ban on internet sales and its effect on competition. The core of 
the case is mainly if such a ban is classified as a „hardcore‟ restriction and thus 
cannot be exempted from Article 101(1) TFEU under 101(3) TFEU according to 
the „Block Exemption Regulation‟188.  
 
Background 
Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique (Pierre Fabre) is a French company that is 
active in the production and sale of cosmetics and personal care products. Pierre 
Fabre is part of the Pierre Fabre Group which is a Subsidiary to L‟Oréal. Its 
subsidiaries create products that are sold, under the trade names: Klorane, Ducray, 
Galénic and Avène, the respective subsidiaries, at pharmacies around France and 
Europe. Pierre Fabre owned in 2007 20% of the French product market. In the 
contracts between Pierre Fabre and the pharmacies there was a clause that stated 
that, there had to be at least one qualified pharmacist present during the opening 
hours, who is trained to acquire the thorough knowledge, of the products, 
necessary to give the consumer all the information about proper use of the 
products. There was also demanded that the products were made available for the 
consumers at a physical space, eliminating any possibility to make sales on the 
internet.
189
  
The French competition board opened an investigation of the market for 
cosmetics and personal care products and through its decision on 27 June 2006 it 
approved and made binding the commitments from the undertakings under 
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investigation to amend their contracts in order to enable the members of the sales 
network to sell products via the internet. Pierre Fabre however, was exempted 
from this and was subjected to a separate examination.  
Pierre Fabre argued in the hearing before the Rapporteur on March 11 2008 
that the ban on internet sales were justified by the fact that the products requires 
advice from a qualified pharmacist since they are developed as health care 
products best suited for specific skin problems for instance intolerant skins can get 
an allergic reaction. Selling the products over the internet would not meet the 
expectations of its consumers have and Pierre Fabre emphasized the fact that the 
products are recommended by the medical profession. Defending the ban on 
internet sales, Pierre Fabre claimed that it had the right to do so since the 
organiser of a network has the right to ban sales made out of an unauthorized 
place of establishment, even when it is made by an authorized distributor. Also the 
coverage by its distributors is enough to make it possible for all customers 
interested in Pierre Fabre‟s products to access them and therefore the ban has no 
effect on the intra-brand competition.
190
  
 To summarize, the competition board decided that, the ban constitutes a 
„hardcore‟ restriction on competition by object and cannot benefit from the 
exemption despite its market position. A web page is not considered as a place of 
establishment as found in Article 4(b) of the Block Exemption Regulation. Pierre 
Fabre had failed to show that the ban constituted any positive effects on the 
competition, distribution or consumer welfare. The decision gave Pierre Fabre 
three months to amend the distribution agreements, removing the ban and if it 
wanted, set up rules for how the design should be on the distributors‟ web 
pages.
191
    
On 24 December 2008, Pierre Fabre brought and action for annulment of the 
decision before the Court of Appeal in Paris (the referring court). It argued that 
the decision was flawed by an error of law since it was not based on a proper 
analysis of the legal and economic context of the case, which is mandatory in 
order to establish the existence of an infringement by object. The ban was 
„necessarily‟ anticompetitive and its purpose was to ensure satisfactory service for 
the consumers, not restrict competition. Lastly, Pierre Fabre argued that there was 
an error of law made when it did not benefit from the block exemption or from 
Article 101(3) TFEU since the ban is ensuring consumer welfare, limiting risks of 
free-riding, removing it would not generate any further competition or price 
reduction and they had not been given the possibility to present their objective 
justification. 
In a written observation submitted on 11 June 2009, the Commission stated 
that the ban does restrict competition by object, thus infringing article 101(1) 
TFEU and the market shares does not matter since it is a „hardcore‟ restriction 
limiting active and passive sales. An exemption based on objective justification 
for „hardcore‟ restrictions is granted only in exceptional cases. It is for Pierre 
Fabre to prove that the ban is fulfilling the four conditions for an exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Based on this observation the Court of Appeal stayed proceedings on 29 
October 2009 and asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The question referred 
was if a ban on internet sales for distributors constitute a „hardcore‟ restriction of 
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competition by object, violating Article 101(1) and is not covered by the Block 
Exemption Regulation but potentially eligible for an exemption under Article 
101(3) TFEU? 
 
Opinion of Advocate General 
AG Mazak divided the question into three parts. 
First, if the ban constitutes a restriction of competition under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, second, if the restriction can be granted an exemption under the Block 
Exemption Regulation and third if it does not fall under the scope of the Block 
Exemption Regulation can the ban benefit from an individual exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Mazak noted that most of the observing governments and the Commission 
considered the ban an infringement of Article 101(1) by object. The French 
government gave an alternative view that there is a lack of knowledge of whether 
this ban actually has by its nature the object of restricting competition and that it 
is fully possible that this ban contributes to an improved image of the trademark 
and leads to better intra-mark competition.
192
 The Commission clarified that the 
prohibition of the ban on internet sales does not prejudice manufacturers from 
choosing its distributors based on criteria and qualitative conditions regarding 
advertising and sales of the products. 
EFTA argued that the ban can only be regarded as proportionate if the 
legitimate requirements, that the distribution system is based on, cannot be 
fulfilled through internet sales. Further the ban constitutes a restriction by object if 
it makes the national market more difficult for interpenetration, thus limiting 
parallel trade.
193
   
Mazak states that the case law of the CJEU,
194
 establishes that regard must be 
taken to the content of the provisions of the agreement, the objectives it seeks to 
attain and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part in order to 
establish that there is an infringement by object.
195
 He also pointed out that even if 
an agreement contains a restricting provision that after examination would be 
considered as being restrictive by object, there is no legal presumption that it 
infringes Article 101(1) TFEU.
196
 The CJEU‟s case law have stated that if an 
agreement does not fulfill all the conditions of exemption in a regulation then it 
falls under Article 101(1) if it is restricting competition by object and effects the 
trade between Member States. The agreement would be void according to Article 
101(2) if it cannot be granted an individual exemption through Article 101(3).
197
  
Mazak notices that it is fully possible for an agreement to not fulfill the 
conditions for an exemption and thus still not have the objective or effect of 
restricting competition pursuant to Article 101 TFEU. 
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In order to avoid Article 101 TFEU there has to be an objective justification for 
the ban on internet sales. AG Mazak does not accept Pierre Fabre‟s argument that 
it is for the health and safety of the consumers that there is mandatory with the 
presence of a pharmacist in a physical store. Some voluntary measures might fall 
outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU if they are in line with the agreement‟s 
objective and does not go beyond the principle of proportionality. The intention to 
give advice regarding proper use of its products was deemed as not constituting an 
objective justification for the ban, so Mazak rejected that claim from Pierre Fabre.  
He also rejected the argument that the ban was used as defense against free-
riding and counterfeiting. Though Mazak confirms that free-riding is a legitimate 
concern he argues that there could be non-discriminatory conditions put on the 
distributors‟ web sales which would limit the risk of free-riders and 
counterfeiters.
198
  
Mazak considers that the ban on internet sales is a part of the selection of 
members to Pierre Fabre‟s distribution system and acknowledges that there are 
other factors than prices that can constitute a legit reason for restricting 
competition.
199
 It is apparent from the case that Pierre Fabre choses its distributors 
in a non-discriminatory matter and the conditions laid down, are for protection of 
the image of the trademark. For Mazak it is appears that the conditions for a 
distribution agreement leading to a restriction of parallel trade does not have the 
object to restrict competition but rather the aim to protect the image of the 
trademark.
200
 
Mazak states that it is fully possible that a ban on internet sales could be 
accepted, however, only in exceptional cases and it is for the national courts to 
decide e.g. by examining whether the advisory service that is provided in the 
physical stores could be provided over the internet.
201
  
He takes the view that the ban on internet sales has the object of restricting 
competition, falling under Article 101(1) TFEU, if it goes beyond what is 
objectively necessary in order to distribute the products in a way that does not 
harm the quality or image of them.
202
 The ban cannot be granted an exemption 
under the Block Exemption Regulation since it is restricting parallel trade. A web 
page cannot be considered as a place of establishment, thus it is not possible for a 
manufacturer to oppose distributor selling of the products on it. Lastly Mazak 
considers that it is insufficient information provided in order to answer the third 
question regarding Article 101(3) TFEU and states that it is possible for the ban to 
be awarded an exemption under the said article if it improves distribution or 
production, benefits consumers, does not impose any unnecessary restrictions on 
the parties and does not risk eliminating the competition for a substantial part of 
the products in question.
203
 
 
Decision of the CJEU 
Just as AG Mazak the CJEU divided the question into three parts. The court 
considers, just like the commission that the requirement of a physical space and 
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presence of a pharmacist reduces the ability for distributors to sell the products to 
customers outside the contracted territory of activity. The court refers to earlier 
case law where it has been established that selective distribution systems affect 
competition of the Union and unless there is an objective justification for it, they 
are considered as restrictions by object.
204
 If a selective distribution system has a 
legitimate goal that is capable of improving competition in factors other than 
price, it can constitute a justification for reducing competition.
205
 
The CJEU considers that the distributors in Pierre Fabre‟s distribution system 
are chosen on the basis of an objective criterion, which has not been used in a 
discriminatory manner, in order to protect the quality of its products. However, 
providing advice and protecting a prestigious image of the trademark does not 
constitute justification for banning internet sales and thus falls under the scope of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.
206
 The CJEU states that Pierre Fabre‟s market position 
makes in eligible for an exemption from the competition rules in accordance with 
the Block Exemption Regulation. However, the ban on internet sales has, at least, 
the object of restricting passive sales to customers outside the territory of the 
distributors‟ physical establishment. Pierre Fabre‟s argument that web pages are 
the same as unauthorized places of establishments was rejected. According to the 
CJEU the ban on internet sales cannot be exempted from Article 101(1) TFEU 
through the Block Exemption Regulation.
207
  
Due to lack of information the CJEU is unable to provide guidance regarding 
the possibility of an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. It states 
however that it is possible that the ban can benefit from an individual exemption if 
the four conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU are met.
208
 
 
Discussion 
The case does not concern trademark legislation but still it discusses a very 
important question: Can the protection of a trademarks prestigious image justify a 
ban on internet sales? 
AG Mazak is not positive in this case but he does agree that it is possible that 
there can be situations where it is justified, although only in exceptional cases. 
The CJEU does not follow his belief. Instead it states that protecting the image of 
the trademark does not justify such a ban.  
The court‟s decision results in a limitation of the exercise of the trademark 
right in a way that I cannot agree with. As stated by AG Jacobs in his opinion in 
HAG II
209
, it is the proprietor who is responsible for the quality of the goods 
bearing his mark, should it then not be up to him to protect the reputation and 
image of that mark to a larger extent than the CJEU is giving him in this case?  
Some consumers might consider it negative that the product is available online 
since it then makes it less exclusive, I mean, anyone can purchase it no matter 
what location. Those consumers could then be the clientele that a proprietor is 
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interested in and not allowing him to decide where the goods should be sold 
would effectively damage his trademark‟s value.  
47 
 
5 Discussion 
The case law used in the thesis, although not exhaustive, shows that there is not 
the existence of the trademarks that is anticompetitive. Actually, neither the 
existence nor exercise of a trademark right is really the cause of interference 
between Intellectual Property law and Competition law. It is rather how the 
exercise of the right is performed.
210
 As stated by the CJEU in Hoffman La-
Roche
211
 the IPR is not anticompetitive unless it is used as an instrument. This 
was confirmed by the CJEU in Magill
212
.
213
 In this case, the CJEU stated that the 
exercise of an exclusive right in exceptional cases might involve abusive conduct. 
Dominant TV-companies not providing a publisher of a TV-guide with 
information about its programing abused its dominant position, since no objective 
justification was presented by the TV-companies.
214
 As shown by the judgements 
in CICRA v Renault and Volvo v Veng
215
 the exercise of an exclusive right 
resulting in a refusal to supply the protected goods is seen as a violation of Article 
102 TFEU if the undertaking, at least, has a dominant position.
216
  
The judgement of the CJEU in Consten & Grundig
217
 is not very well thought 
by some scholars.
218
 It has been said that the judgement is a result of the 
Commission being “overzealous” in its interpretation of its role as a protector of 
the trade between Member States.
219
 I would like to see an identical situation to 
the one in Consten & Grundig today. I believe that the outcome could be 
different. After Consten & Grundig the CJEU came with the principle of 
exhaustion in Deutsche Grammophon
220
. Could the conclusion be the same that 
the granting of an exclusive license to a licensee to register and become the 
proprietor of the trademark in a second Member State can be considered as 
hindering parallel trade? 
I have a hard time seeing the answer being anything else but in the negative. If 
a product has legally been put on the market by the proprietor, his right is 
exhausted. Therefore, it should not be an issue to have a licensee being the 
proprietor of the trademark in another Member State, being able to prevent 
infringements of the trademark. Preventing infringements is a right granted by EU 
law and I do not see it being in violation of the competition laws.  
                                                 
210
  Botis, p. 819, see also Anderman, Steven and Schmidt, Hedvig, „EU Competition law and 
Intellectual Property Rights‟ the Regulation of Innovation, Second Edition 2011, Oxford 
University Press New York, p. 21. 
211
  Case 85/76, Hoffman La-Roche, ECR 461. 
212
  Joined Cases 241-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd v Commission of the European Communities and Magill, 6 April 1995, [1995] ECR I-0743 
(Magill). 
213
  Anderman, p. 24. 
214
  Joined Cases 241-242/91 P, Magill, para. 54-55. 
215
  Case C-238/87, Volvo v Veng, ECR 6211. 
216
  Käseberg, Thorsten, ‟Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU 
and the US‟, First Edition 2012, Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland, p. 219. 
217
  Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, ECR 299. 
218
  Keeling, pp. 54-55. 
219
  Anderman, p. 236. 
220
  Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon, ECR 487. 
48 
 
It can be argued that at this point the Union is in need for more harmonized 
trademark legislation. As Keurkoop
221
 shows, some national legislation can 
contain provisions that are not supported by other legislations. It was a while ago 
since the case was before the CJEU and changes have been made to the EU-
legislation since then. The strange provision of the Benelux legislation in the case 
has been questioned and it has been argued that it is next to, if not impossible, to 
see any possible justification for granting a copyist an exclusive right to someone 
else‟s work, without the authorization of the creator.222 
It has been argued that the CJEU have systematically made it easier for 
proprietors to invoke anti-dilution protection and thus created an overbroad brand 
image protection.
223
 However, it can also been argued that the CJEU recently have 
taken steps that limit the trademark protection and through its unqualified 
judgement it weakened the protection for trademark‟s images.224  
The CJEU did, in its ruling in Nungesser
225
, state that an open exclusive license 
that provides protection for licensee against competition is not in itself 
incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. However, the protection can only 
concern competition from other licensees or the licensor itself. This is a limitation 
of the protection,
226
  but it is not surprising since placing limits on licensees of 
other territories and parallel importer would take the license outside the scope of 
an open license.
227
 
The case law presented shows different levels of limitations of the exercise of 
trademark rights. The receptions of those decisions are however with mixed 
feelings. Some cases like BAT
228
 and Der Grüne Punkt
229
 consist of behaviour 
that could be considered as questionable business ethics. In the first, the proprietor 
acted on behalf of a trademark right, which was not being used. This is 
understandable since a trademark might be registered and not used e.g. due to the 
launching campaign not being completely prepared. However, preventing sales of 
another mark, whose similarity can be questioned, in the way BAT did cannot be 
accepted due to its low business ethics.  
The latter case concerns a mark whose objective is not that of a normal mark. 
Therefore, the exercise of that mark could be submitted to different restrictions. 
The judgment of the CJEU did however; lack the possibility for a wider scope of 
protection of trademark rights under license agreements as presented by AG in his 
opinion.  
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In BMW v Deenik the CJEU do limit the exercise of trademark rights but it still 
keeps the option for a wider protection open. Although the decision ruled against 
BMW, the CJEU did state that proprietors of a reputed mark could prevent the use 
of its mark in advertisements, even descriptive ones, for products that have been 
put on the market with the consent of the proprietor. The issue of course is that 
there has to be some damage inflicted upon the marks value or image in order for 
the proprietor to invoke its rights of the TMD and the TMR.  
In Pierre Fabre, the court however shuts the door for proprietors wanting to 
protect their marks image. The case does not concern the prevention for 
competitors of using the mark. The decision in Pierre Fabre reflects the attitude of 
the CJEU mentioned in the beginning of the paper.  
Although the legal history presented in Chapter 2 shows that the CJEU has 
become less negative towards intellectual property, some of it seems to be still 
there. The cases presented in Chapter 4 are all very different but they all have in 
common limitations put on trademarks exercise.  
As shown by the CJEU there can be a debate of the actual damage caused by 
internet sales. Further evidence regarding its risks is the extended protection 
proposed by the commission regarding proprietors‟ prevention of third parties 
import of counterfeited goods from third countries. The latter being a measure 
available to deter purchases of such counterfeited goods online. There cannot 
however be a discussion about the internet putting trademarks at risks. In the 
recent past the CJEU handled a new type of trademark infringement, namely pay 
per click advertisements. In the case Google France
230
, the court was faced with 
the question if the provider of a reference service infringes the trademark when he 
makes the mark available as a keyword for competitors to use for reference to 
their advertisements.  
The case concerns Google‟s reference service „AdWords‟, for which Google 
charge the users a fee and the service provides with sponsored links in a window 
besides the search engine‟s results from advertisements corresponding with the 
searches word or phrase. The issue is that undertakings choose keywords identical 
to its own name but also to competitors, some even had famous trademarks as 
keywords that used together with words indicating forgeries would display its 
advertisements under the heading „sponsored links‟. The list under sponsored 
links would not necessarily give the most visited or relevant ads, since it was 
based on how much the undertakings were paying, the more you pay, the higher 
up on the list you come. Several undertakings, including the very well-known 
Louis Vuitton, discovered the use of their trademarks as described above and 
initiated procedures against Google and its French subsidiary.  
The French Cour de Cassation received the case through appeal from the 
earlier instances by Google who was found infringing the trademarks concerned. 
It stayed its proceedings and asked the CJEU if Google and the advertisers are 
infringing the trademark proprietor‟s exclusive right within the meaning of Article 
5(1) TMD and Article 9(1) TMR when selling/purchasing keywords, which are 
similar or identical to the proprietors‟ trademarks to trigger the display link to the 
advertiser‟s website and if the proprietors are able to prohibit it. Further, it asked 
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whether the proprietor of a reputed mark can oppose such use, as stated above, in 
accordance with Article 5.2 TMD and Article 9.1(c) TMR.
231
 
The CJEU ruled that although Google carried out a commercial activity by 
charging the advertisers a fee for the keywords and provided competitors and 
imitators with trademarks without the proprietors consent, it did not use the 
trademarks itself within the meaning of the TMD and TMR. The advertisers 
however were.
232
 The CJEU argued that, creating the technical conditions 
necessary for a sign to be used and then being paid for that service does not mean 
that the party that offers said service is using the sign itself.
233
 There is no use “in 
the course of trade” thus no infringement by Google, within the meaning of 
Article 5 TMD and Article 9 TMR, the CJEU did not examine Google‟s use 
relating to goods and services or if the use has an adverse effect on the 
trademark.
234
 
The case made it clear that trademark owners will not be able to stop Google 
providing their trademarks as keywords to competitors through their reference 
service „Adwords‟. Advertisers using their trademarks in the text of their 
advertisements in the sponsored links can be prevented from doing so if the end 
user cannot ascertain whether the goods/services in the ad belong to the trademark 
owner or the advertiser. Google‟s involvement with choosing keywords and the 
text of the advertisements must be non-existent. If Google gets involved with 
drafting advertisements or helping customers to choose keywords in the future it 
might no longer benefit from reduced responsibility. To sum up, the simple supply 
and purchase of keywords does not constitute trademark infringement. Google is 
free from liability at the moment as long as its role remains passive.  
The internet constitutes another way for infringements to take place and as 
shown by the CJEU‟s judgment in Google France trademark infringements occur 
when a trademark is used by a competitor or imitator through a keyword to trigger 
the display of his advertisements in a reference service such as Google‟s 
„Adwords‟ and the proprietor can prohibit the use. As a preparatory measure to 
ensure that the mark is not used in such a manner the proprietors cannot prohibit 
the provider of such a service form making the words available, as long as the 
provider is passive and does not e.g. aid the advertisers to choose keywords.  
Preparatory measures can take very different forms. It has been attempted by 
proprietors, through agreements, to a) license its trademark right and all protective 
powers it is granted,
235
 b) limit another trademark by not allowing its use for the 
products it is actually registered for.
236
 In both situations the CJEU found that the 
measures was in violation of Article 101 TFEU. The second situation is 
understandably not acceptable. The conduct of limiting the use of a competing 
trademark in such a manner that it cannot be used for the products it actually 
concerns is not only distorting competition but is not in line with good business 
ethics. There is a need for protecting registered marks which has not been used for 
several reasons. The marketing plan might not be finished so there would not be 
possible to do a good „launch‟ of the product baring the mark. It might not be time 
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for „launch‟ for the product due to its connection to a special date. It is necessary 
to protect trademarks that have yet to be commercially used since it otherwise 
could be taken by someone else. However it is important that the measures taken 
for the protection is reasonable and justified, and although there is a need for BAT 
to protect its mark, but the limitation of the other marks use was neither 
reasonable nor justified, since the similarity between the marks were not very 
apparent. It could occur situations where more similar marks could be faced with 
the same issue. The type of agreement used in this case, limiting the use of the 
marks for certain products, could most certainly be accepted as long as it does not 
restrict one of the contracted parties to a larger extent than the other and does not 
divide the market without bringing any significant positive effect for the benefit of 
consumers.  
As for licensing the proprietary right the competition issue should not occur as 
a result of the principle of exhaustion. The licensee acting as a proprietor of the 
licensors trademark in another Member State, thus being able to hinder any 
unauthorized use of the trademark should not restrict the competition on the 
market today in the same way it was considered doing in the 1960s. The TRIPS-
Agreement acknowledges that licensing of IPRs can restrict competition,
237
 and 
yes the licensee will be able to limit the use of the trademark on the market, but it 
is still regarding unauthorized use. It can be agreed that if there are two 
proprietors of the same mark in two Member States, it will not be possible for 
third parties to purchase and sell the trademarked goods if the proprietors does not 
allow them. X can‟t purchase Y‟s products with the goal to sell them in Member 
State B because Z is the exclusive licensee and proprietor of the trademark in B. 
Naturally X would not sell goods which risks infringing the licensee‟s exclusivity. 
However, the third party‟s marketing of the goods cannot be opposed by either of 
the proprietors as long as the goods have been put on the market with the approval 
of one of them. It is true that the licensing in this case would result in a limitation 
of the market, since there will be a lesser chance that authorized products would 
find its way to the territory covered by the proprietors. This would however not be 
any different if the licensee would just be the exclusive distributor of the mark. 
 The products would not be marketed there by another undertaking with 
authorization from the proprietor since that would violate the exclusivity of the 
licensee. The difference is that the mark would have a stronger protection where 
another undertaking than the original proprietor could claim the trademark right 
infringed without the original proprietor having to be concerned since the licensee 
would have the same right and it would not be possible to hinder parallel trade of 
goods that are lawfully put on the market with the proprietors consent. It could 
occur questions regarding which of the proprietors‟ consent are needed but most 
likely one would not grant consent without consulting the other, at least not the 
licensee. Guidance could be laid down by the license agreement, where this 
situation and its solution is treated.  
Depending on the purpose of the mark the measures taken to protect it can be 
seen differently in the light of competition law.
238
 A normal trademark‟s 
identification purpose is vital for consumers to distinguish undertakings‟ products 
from each other, if the purpose of the trademark is diminished so is the trademark, 
as having the trademarks for two cola flavored beverages on the same package 
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  TRIPS-Agreement, art. 40. 
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  See Case C-385/07, Der Grüne Punkt. 
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would cause major confusion of the products origin. If the marks purpose however 
is of a different nature, as informing what happens with the product after 
consumption or at least the packaging, then a competing trademark next to it 
won‟t perhaps affect the consumer in the same way as in the earlier situation. 
Surely the distinctiveness of the mark and its purpose will not be as great when it 
is shares space with another trademark, but the nature of the mark will most likely 
not affect sales and result in damage. The measures then taken in order to protect 
the mark, receiving payment for packaging bearing the trademark but the service 
connected to it is not performed due to coexistence of a competing mark cannot be 
considered as acceptable according to competition law since it in this case 
constitutes abuse of a dominant position, perhaps it would be allowed for smaller 
undertakings but it is still not good business ethics to charge a fee for a service not 
provided. Understandably the proprietor wishes to ensure that his mark is not 
diminished but as stated the nature of the mark in this case makes the mark less 
likely to suffer damage from coexistence with another mark since it is not a 
decisive factor for consumers.  
Reputed trademarks can to a larger extent be protected since the line for 
infringements is drawn more generously for those proprietors. This is settled by 
the CJEU in several cases, and a possibility through national law, in a not too 
distant future perhaps even an obligation for national legislations.
239
 However, 
both defensive and preparatory measures can be considered violating competition 
law or just not be lawful according to trademark law.
240
 The unauthorized use of a 
trademark identical to the proprietor‟s trademark for products both identical and 
not identical products can be prohibited if the proprietor‟s mark has a reputation. 
Further, it is even possible to circumvent the principle of exhaustion if the mark is 
reputed, however, only if the unauthorized use is damaging the reputation of the 
mark or not in line with the proprietors will. An absolute ban on internet sales is 
not justified, not even if the reason is to protect the respectable image of a mark. 
A respectable images is not necessarily the same as a reputation, if a similar 
situation would occur with a reputed trademark the ban could be considered a 
necessity. However, the CJEU's judgment gives little cause to believe that it 
would be a possibility. It stated that passively making it possible to infringe 
trademarks is not considered an infringement and thus proprietors are not able to 
prohibit it, not even proprietors of famous marks,
241
 so banning internet sales 
would then not be possible even for those proprietors. Although the internet has 
proven to be a risk zone for trademark infringements the CJEU clearly does not 
consider the risks to be great enough for ban on online sales. Perhaps with the new 
amendments there might be a change of the CJEU‟s decisions in the future but for 
now it seems reluctant to protect trademarks on the internet.  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
239
  Presented in Chapter 2.3.1 and Chapter 3. 
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  See Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre and Case C-63/97, BMW v Deenik. 
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  See Joined cases C-236/08-C-238/08, Google France. 
53 
 
6 Analysis 
In the eyes of proprietors, the CJEU have made a lot of progress since its 
foundation. What started with a statement by a AG sarcastically comparing the 
amount of gratitude that should be given a slogan of a trademark and one of the 
world's most important scientific discoveries, has now led to decisions allowing 
proprietors limiting the use of its trademark in unapproved advertisements or the 
use of identical signs for similar or non-similar goods. The legislation has of 
course evolved since then but the CJEU is setting the limitations and its 
judgments are the foundation of the national court‟s rulings.  
A very important factor to the protection of trademarks is the distinctiveness of 
it. It was for instance put forward in the Der Grüne Punkt that the distinctiveness 
of the trademark was of concern and, it was one of the factors behind the measure 
found restricting the competition according to the CJEU. An interesting factor of 
the case was that the proprietor proposed the adding of a mark that would reduce 
the distinctive effect of its mark but this was considered unnecessary according to 
the CJEU. 
A breakthrough for trademarks is perhaps the principle of exhaustion arriving 
from Deutsche Grammophon. Although proprietors would like to always be in 
control of the trademark right the principle of exhaustion reduces, in my opinion, 
the risks of agreements like in Consten & Grundig to fall under the scope of the 
competition rules. Since the trademark right is exhausted as soon as the product 
has been put on the market with the consent of the proprietor, what constitutes the 
negative effect on competition when the licensee is the proprietor of the trademark 
in the second Member State if the products it is allowed to prohibit, is not legal. 
Some clarity is needed on the matter, as for the consent from the proprietor in 
cases with two proprietors. It would then be recommended to include provisions 
in a licensing agreement, for the purpose as in Consten & Grundig, regarding 
whose consent is needed or how such consent is granted, by both or by one.   
The extended protection granted to marks with a reputation is confirmed by the 
CJEU in, for instance, Davidoff v Gofkid. The simple explanation given by the 
CJEU generated a more extensive protection for reputed marks against use of 
identical signs for similar goods. Tough the explanation is simple the CJEU has a 
point. The protection cannot be weaker for a reputed mark against similar goods 
than non-similar.  
Without harmonization of the trademark legislations situations like in 
Keurkoop can occur. To grant the protection of an intellectual property right to a 
design that is copied from another undertaking outside the EU is not a good way 
to go. Although it is possible to get the right revoked, it is only the original 
proprietor that could do so. The justification for this type of grants is most likely 
non-existent since it would have a negative effect on the intellectual property 
rights in general. If it would be possible to just copy a non-EU mark, not known 
on the EU market either, and benefit from a trademark protection with only the 
original proprietor being able to object the registration, the innovative part of the 
trademark will become obsolete. The creation of new trademarks will be halted 
and the energy will be focused on finding a quite well used mark that is not 
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known in the EU and register it. This is however, thanks to the international 
agreements such as the Paris Convention and TRIPS-Agreement, not accepted.  
The difference made between the existence and exercise of a trademark right is 
vital for the trademark protection. It was founded almost 50 years ago and is still 
of importance today. Scholars argue that the Existence/Exercise Dichotomy is too 
vague and inapplicable and not used any more. I believe that it is still serves a 
purpose and following the case law used in this thesis, one can see that the issue is 
always the exercise of the trademark right. The Dichotomy is a principle of law 
acting as a reminder that though the competition law can limit the exercise of a 
trademark right it must never affect the rights existence. Here the opinions can 
differ. Looking at BAT, BMW v Deenik and Der Grüne Punkt I consider there to 
be restrictions of the exercise of the trademark right but the restrictions are 
however not damaging to the marks in question.  
In BAT the actions of the proprietor was very questionable for being aimed at 
protecting the mark, it seemed like the most important goal of the agreement in 
question was to prevent the sales of Seger‟s trademarked goods. Der Grüne Punkt 
concerns a similar problem with several factors affecting the judgment. The 
quality of the service the trademark concerned did not correspond with the fee 
charged for it. This together with arguments that did not constitute justification for 
trademark protection resulted in a limitation and in the eyes of the proprietor a 
compulsory license. DSD argued that the marks distinctiveness would be affected 
by the placing of another mark alongside its DGP mark. The CJEU did not see 
this as an issue mainly due to the marks special object of the mark indicating that 
the product would get recycled rather not informing of the packaging‟s origin. 
In BMW v Deenik the CJEU mainly confirmed the wording of the TMD. The 
principle found in Article 7(2) TMD meant that the exhaustion principle created 
by the court in Deutche Grammophon could be overruled if it exist a legitimate 
reason for the proprietor to oppose use of his trademark for products even put on 
the market by him. Although this was actually stated in Dior before the ruling in 
BMW v Deenik, the latter case concluded that advertisements describing the 
business of the alleged infringer are not considered as damaging the trademark it 
uses and the advantage the use brings through the qualitative aura of the mark is 
not equal to the unfair advantage mentioned in 5(2) TMD. Therefore the 
proprietor cannot oppose such use since it is not damaging, hence the difference 
between the decisions in Dior and BMW v Deenik. 
As presented in the previous chapter the limitations of trademark exercising is 
guided by the principle of proportionality. Pierre Fabre is a key example of the 
collision between the competition rules and trademark protection. The CJEU rules 
that the prohibition of internet sales is restricting the market, which is true but 
should it not be up to the proprietor to decide? 
Since the products in question was not deemed as medicines and not of the 
nature as being required to be sold with a pharmacist present, the need for the 
products are not so vital that there is a need for internet sales. As Pierre Fabre 
argued, it has pharmacies all over the territory of France that is selling the 
products so the geographical limitation is not so severe. Further, I would like to ad 
that the mark is perhaps not so well known on the Union market, meaning that the 
products not being available online does not constitute a major restriction of the 
consumers of cosmetics and personal care products. Pierre Fabre felt that internet 
sales could damage its trademarks‟ respectable image, which most likely the sales 
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with the consultation possibility of a pharmacist would perhaps not only maintain 
but maybe even strengthen. The Commission considered that the ban on sales in 
order to protect the trademarks image in this case, was not justified since there 
were less restrictive measures that could have been taken, such as specifications 
on how the web display of the products should be. Despite this the AG still 
remained open to the possibility of cases where a ban on internet sales could be 
justified by the aim to protect the respectable image of a trademark, although 
emphasizing that the circumstances has to be exceptional. The CJEU was much 
narrower in its view and perhaps not completely aware of the issues that can occur 
through the internet. It considers that the cosmetics as not being a risky product in 
need of a trained professional present during a sale. Agreed that the products are 
not equal to medicines but this argument is missing the point that even cosmetics 
such as makeup can cause allergic reactions. It is however, another factor making 
the product more extravagant. It can only be purchased in a physical store and a 
„trained professional‟ is present so recommendations and help can be provided, 
that gives the image of a very exclusive product and if it just as well can be 
bought via the internet then it is not more special than other brands. Customers 
can be just as superficial as that and, maybe that is the target group for the 
product, it is not right that the CJEU is limiting the proprietors right in creating his 
desired image for his trademark.  
As stated by AG Jacobs in HAG II the manufacturer decides upon the quality 
of his goods and is the one to pay the price if alternating with the quality of the 
product, it should then be up to him to decide upon sales as well. Even if the 
reason for not wanting a product to be available online is as superficial as just 
making it seem more exclusive, shouldn‟t that be up to the proprietor to decide?  
If the CJEU still wants to prevent Pierre Fabre from prohibiting sales of its 
products on the internet, it should at least be open for the possibility that there 
might come cases where the situations where the image of the trademark is being 
damaged by internet sales. I believe that the standpoint of the CJEU in this case is 
the type of restriction of a trademark right‟s exercise that affects its existence. If 
the image of the mark cannot be protected, then how is the existence of the mark 
to be protected? 
The proposed legislations are not going to alter the decisions of the CJEU. 
They will amend the existing legislation by adding to the provisions of what can 
be protected. In addition, the proprietors will be granted a stronger right to prevent 
the importation of counterfeit products from outside the EU. Without pointing any 
fingers at any nation it is known that there are parts of the world, outside the EU, 
where counterfeiting is a major issue. Making it harder for these products to 
appear on the European market is vital for the reputations of the trademarks of the 
Union. In Certain categories of products, such as medicines, it is beneficial for 
consumer safety that the counterfeited products can be prevented to circulate the 
Union market, while perhaps for clothing it is rather for the safety of the 
trademarks. Granting proprietors greater powers to make it less attractive to 
acquire counterfeit products online might not be appreciated by consumers 
wishing to purchase some cheap copies online. However, in order to maintain the 
marks reputed image and prevent the illegal use of their property the proprietors 
are in need of this extra strength.   
This is a very positive piece of news, if it will be part of the final draft. The 
legislation of the Member States, through these amendments, will be brought 
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closer together and perhaps in a not too distant future we will have harmonized 
trademark legislation in the EU.  
We still face the dilemma of the conflict between competition and trademark 
law. As shown by the cases in this thesis the situations differ widely and to give 
more direct statements is not possible for the CJEU, GC or AG. The judgments 
have to be made on a case-by-case basis with the Existence/Exercise Dichotomy 
in mind, perhaps a bit modernized. With the judgement in Pierre Fabre in the 
back of my mind, it is daunting to say that the CJEU actually risks limiting the 
exercise of a trademark right to such an extent that its existence risks being 
damaged. 
It seems like the CJEU does not consider the trademark image as important 
enough to protect from the risks internet bear. As shown by Google France the 
internet have opened for a new range of possible infringements and the proprietors 
need to have the means to protect themselves from damage before it occurs. Court 
procedures can be a costly matter that some might not afford, therefore it is 
necessary to have some preparatory measures available to protect the marks.  
Although the internet is a risk zone as shown in Google France the CJEU is 
not willing to accept the risks internet cause for trademarks images‟ reputation. It 
is not necessary to accept Pierre Fabre‟s argumentation for banning internet sales, 
but the AG recognizes that situations might occur in the future, where the 
respectable image of a trademark is justification for limiting distribution online. It 
would have been a welcomed recognition from the CJEU if it could have followed 
that reasoning thus recognizing the value of a mark‟s image, unfortunately the 
CJEU is still not as positive towards trademarks as one would hope.   
To summarize, the CJEU have given some guidance on the difference between 
excessive and acceptable protective measures. The cases presented shows that so 
far the CJEU seems to, not accept preparatory measures that limit the market 
without positive results for the benefits of consumers. Defensive measures are not 
of concern since trademark law guarantees them. The same regards the right to 
license the intellectual property right but perhaps with the principle of exhaustion 
it is not an issue for the trade between Member States today as it was almost 50 
years ago. Factors as the trademarks purpose and reputation are of importance 
whether the measures taken are acceptable or not. The reputed marks can benefit 
from an extended protection that might even circumvent the principle of 
exhaustion as long as damage can occur to it. However, preparatory measures 
seems at this stage not be accepted by the CJEU and even if an undertaking‟s 
trademark is considered having a reputation it is not likely that the measures 
presented in this thesis would be accepted on that basis. The amendments will 
generate more tools for proprietors to use against infringers and a greater level of 
legal certainty. Further, it seems possible that the extensive protection for reputed 
marks will become an obligation. Perhaps in the future it will be possible for 
proprietors to justify e.g. bans on internet sales as protection for their famous 
trademarks‟ images, but at the time, sadly, the CJEU have stated that this type of 
preparatory measures are not in accordance with the competition rules. 
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7 Conclusion 
What measures a proprietor can take in order to protect his trademark differs.  
The EU-legislations provide a non-exhaustive list of different situations that 
allow a proprietor to hinder the use of his mark without his authorization. 
Proprietors need to be creative in their solutions in order to hinder infringements 
from occurring. The defensive measures are not an issue for the competition rules 
while the preparatory measures represented in e.g. Consten & Grundig and Pierre 
Fabre both were considered as violating Article 101 TFEU. Using agreements 
with clauses laying down rules for the trademark for licensees is one way. By 
writing a very nice cease and desist letter and then use it for commercial purposes 
generating good publicity by looking like a responsible undertaking is another 
way. The measures can take many different forms but as long as they are 
restricting competition without objective justification and no positive effect on 
distribution or development, they will not escape the scope of Article 101 TFEU. 
It was obvious for the CJEU that a famous trademark should benefit from at 
least an identical protection against use of similar marks for similar goods. A 
proprietor of a reputed mark should also have the right to prevent the use of his 
trademarked products, for which his right is exhausted, in advertisements that is 
damaging to the trademarks reputation. However, a proprietor of a trademark 
cannot prevent his products from being sold over the internet by his contracted 
dealers in order to protect the trademarks respectable image and it is unlikely that 
a proprietor of a reputed trademark would have that right, since the image 
protection is not a justification. What this mean is that the proprietors of famous 
trademarks are not allowed to take the measures necessary to make sure that their 
clientele does not refrain from its products due to its image not being satisfactory 
respected.  
The case law of the CJEU states that the proprietor of a reputed trademark can 
go further when protecting his trademark, but there are limits to that right as well. 
The proposed amendments for the trademark legislation are going to generate a 
stronger legal certainty. The legislations of the Member States will be closer to 
each other and the extensions of what can be protected as trademarks will upgrade 
the legislation for the modern time we are in. It will no longer be an option to 
generate stronger protection for reputed trademarks, instead it will be mandatory, 
making sure that the legislation will be in line with the judgments of the CJEU.  
The proprietors will be given more powerful tools to combat counterfeiting and 
the EU market will be more difficult to penetrate with infringing products from 
outside the Union. The amended legislation will make the Union somewhat safer 
for trademarks, which is desirable. 
It is clear that the CJEU is of the opinion that internet sales are a distribution 
right and cannot be limited by proprietors wanting to protect the image of their 
trademarks. It should be noted that there might occur situations when the CJEU 
will accept a restriction on internet sales but protecting trademarks apparently is 
not a justification. A mark value is connected to its image and if the image‟s value 
can be diminished then what is left of the mark?   
Taking actions against infringers is dependent on if the use constitutes use in 
the course of business, the exhaustion principle can only be overruled by marks 
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with reputations, only if there occur damage to the marks reputation. Granting a 
contract partner trademark ownership of your mark in a second Member State is 
considered as hindering parallel trade and not in accordance with 101 TFEU, just 
as a ban on internet is not accepted if the reason is to protect your trademark‟s 
image.   
The line between excessive and acceptable trademark protection is not clear. 
The case presented in this thesis it not exhaustive but they paint the picture that 
preparatory measures, such as licensing agreements, that are considered limiting 
the market without positive results for the benefits of consumers will not be 
accepted. Whether it is limiting a competing trademarks use, charging a fee for a 
service indicated by the use of the mark without performing it due to coexistence 
of a competing mark, banning internet sales in order to protect the marks 
respectable image or licensing the exclusive right as a proprietor to another 
undertaking, the CJEU have stated that Article 101 or 102 TFEU will be 
applicable. Market sizes could perhaps change the outcome in certain cases but it 
is not certain. A proprietor of a reputed trademark has a stronger protection 
against infringement than a „normal‟ trademark. He can circumvent the principle 
of exhaustion as long as the use of his mark is damaging its reputation and 
prohibit the use of similar/identical marks for similar/identical goods as well as 
non-similar/identical goods, as long as the origin function is affected and 
confusion for consumers can occur. However, regarding the preparatory measures 
mentioned above it is unlikely that the CJEU would allow e.g. him to ban internet 
sales in order to protect his trademark.  
As often with law it depends. The trademark‟s function, its reputation, 
distinctiveness etc. are all factors that need to be taken into consideration. There is 
no clear line since the CJEU can‟t provide for one due to the complexity of 
trademarks. The proposed amendments might generate some more protection and 
legal certainty but it will still in the end be settled by the CJEU on a case by case 
basis. What is important to remember is that a marks existence must not be 
limited.  
Ending on a sad note, it is worrying to see that trademarks‟ images seem to not 
be important to the CJEU. I do not agree with the court decision in Pierre Fabre, 
not for the refusal to allow Pierre Fabre to protect its mark‟s image, but for not 
following the AG‟s argumentation that it is possible that the protection of the 
trademarks image provides justification for banning internet sales. It would have 
shown that the CJEU is recognizing the value of a marks image but instead it 
casted that fact in the garbage bin, thus taking two steps backwards in the 
development of IPR protection and the existence of trademarks might come into 
question since their image is not of importance in certain circumstances. Without 
its image a trademark would become just as useless as scholars feared since it is a 
too extensive limitation of the exercise of a trademark right. 
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Supplement A 
Cease and desist letter from Jack Daniel‟s to Patrick Wensink author of the 
book „Broken Piano for President‟. 
 
 
